ELECTROMAGNETIC SIDE-CHANNEL ANALYSIS ON INTEL ATOM PROCESSOR by Do, Anh Hoang et al.
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Digital WPI
Major Qualifying Projects (All Years) Major Qualifying Projects
April 2013
ELECTROMAGNETIC SIDE-CHANNEL
ANALYSIS ON INTEL ATOM PROCESSOR
Anh Hoang Do
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Aung Thu Htet
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Soe Thet Ko
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/mqp-all
This Unrestricted is brought to you for free and open access by the Major Qualifying Projects at Digital WPI. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Major Qualifying Projects (All Years) by an authorized administrator of Digital WPI. For more information, please contact digitalwpi@wpi.edu.
Repository Citation
Do, A. H., Htet, A. T., & Ko, S. T. (2013). ELECTROMAGNETIC SIDE-CHANNEL ANALYSIS ON INTEL ATOM PROCESSOR.
Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/mqp-all/1772
ELECTROMAGNETIC SIDE-CHANNEL ANALYSIS
ON INTEL ATOM PROCESSOR
A Major Qualifying Project Report:
submitted to the Faculty
of the
WORCESTER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE
by
Anh Do
Soe Thet Ko
Aung Thu Htet
Date: April 24, 2013
Approved:
Professor Thomas Eisenbarth, Advisor
Professor Berk Sunar, Co-Advisor
Abstract
Side-channel attacks, in particular, power electromagnetic analysis attacks, have gained significant attention
in recent years because they can be conducted relatively easily, yet are powerful. Two types of attacks are
investigated in this project: Simple Electromagnetic Analysis (SEMA), which is extremely eﬀective against
asymmetric cryptography such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm (RSA) and Diﬀerential Electromagnetic
Analysis (DEMA), which is commonly implemented against symmetric cryptography such as Advanced En-
cryption Standard (AES). This project implements SEMA and DEMA attacks based on the electromagnetic
radiation from the Intel Atom Processor during its execution of cryptography algorithms.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Project Motivation
This section give a brief background of cryptography, side-channel attacks, and how they motivate us to
conduct side-channel analysis on an Intel Atom Processor.
1.1.1 Cryptography
Encryption is the primary cryptographic technique to achieve confidentiality of messages between two com-
municating parties over public networks. Nowadays, most of the cryptographic applications are conducted
over digital media. To cite a few, applications include ATM cards, computer passwords, electronic commerce,
etc. In such applications the encryption process typically involves two parties: encryption at the sender side
and decryption at the receiver side. Encryption is the process of converting the original message (called plain-
text) into a secret coded message (called ciphertext). Decryption achieves the reverse, i.e. reconstructing
the plaintext from the received ciphertext. The encryption algorithm uses a key, i.e. a secret, which when
combined with a mathematically defined algorithm renders the plaintext into an unintelligible ciphertext.
At the receiving end, the key is used to decrypt the code and restore the original message. The greater the
number of bits in the secret key, the more possible key combinations and the harder it would take to break
the code using an exhaustive search strategy.
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There are two major categories of encryption schemes: symmetric and asymmetric encryption schemes.
In the symmetric key category, both the sender and receiver use the same key to encrypt and decrypt. A
prominent example is the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm which will be described later in
Section §1.4. In symmetric ciphers encryption and decryption primitives are much faster than in public key
algorithms. However securely delivering the secret key to the recipient in the first place might be a problem.
In contrast, primitives in the second category use a key pair. Each recipient has a private key that is kept
secret and a public key that is published for everyone. The sender uses the recipient’s public key to encrypt
the message, and the recipient uses the private key to decrypt the message. The RSA public key scheme,
described later in Section §1.2, is a good example of the schemes in this category.
1.1.2 Side-channel Attacks
There are several kinds of attacks on cryptographic devices. They share the same goal, to reveal the secret
keys of the devices, but diﬀer significantly in terms of cost, time, equipment, and expertise needed. These
methods could be categorized as follows:
• Invasive Attacks: The device is depackaged, and diﬀerent components of the device are accessed directly
using a probing station. These attacks are extremely powerful but require quite expensive equipments
and may be very diﬃcult to perform under some circumstances.
• Semi-invasive Attacks: The device is depackaged, but no direct electrical contact to the surface is made.
These attacks are powerful, and do not require as expensive equipments as invasive ones. However, the
process of locating the right position for an attack requires quite some time and expertise.
• Noninvasive Attacks: Only directly accessible interfaces of the device are exploited, and therefore
no evidence of an attack is left behind. These attacks can be conducted with relatively inexpensive
equipments, and hence, they pose a serious practical threat to the security of cryptographic devices.
Most of the cryptographic schemes in use have been heavily investigated by cryptography experts to withstand
powerful mathematical attacks. In contrast, most of the very same techniques have been shown to be
vulnerable to attacks targeting their implementations through so-called side-channel attacks [4]. Side-channel
2
attacks, in particular, electromagnetic analysis attacks based on the devices’ radiation, have gained quite
attention in recent years because they are very powerful and can be conducted relatively easily. These
attacks exploit the fact that the instantaneous electromagnetic radiation of a device depends on the data
it processes and on the operation it performs [7]. There are two main types of power analysis attack:
Simple Electromagnetic Analysis (SEMA), which is extremely eﬀective against asymmetric cryptography and
Diﬀerential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA), which is extremely eﬀective against symmetric cryptography.
The detail procedures of these two attacks will be discussed more in Section §1.3 and Section §1.5.
1.1.3 Motivation
Our project involves implementation of side-channel attacks on Intel Atom Processor. In 2008, Intel intro-
duced the processors Silverthorne and Diamondville, which were both released under the name of Atom [1].
Intel targets the Silverthorne for mobile internet devices and Diamondville for personal computers. Intel
Atom processors are high speed, and high performance embedded processors, and they are quite resistant
to side-channel attacks. The fact that it is challenging to implement side-channel attack on Atom board
is one of our project motivations. Another project motivation is the widespread use of Atom processors.
They are used in everyday electronic devices, from net books to various embedded applications. The Pine
Trail Architecture used in Atom Processors brings considerable power saving and improved performance [2].
Therefore, instead of heavy quad core processors, Atoms Processors are used in devices such as Net books,
net-tops, and smartphones, which are used for simple applications such as browsing the internet. With such
a wide field of application, Atom processor is a practical application in real-world that is worth investigating
for side-channel analysis.
1.2 Rivest – Shamir – Adleman (RSA) Algorithm
The RSA algorithm is currently the most widely deployed public key cryptographic scheme. In practice,
RSA is mostly used for encryption of small pieces of data such as key transport, digital signatures and digital
certificates on the Internet. Since it is several times slower than symmetric ciphers due to its computational
complexity, RSA is often used together with a symmetric cipher such as AES, where AES does the actual
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bulk data encryption. With the use of both public key and private key, RSA has an important role to securely
exchange a key for a symmetric cipher. Moreover, the underlying reason for the RSA algorithm is based on
the integer factorization problem: Multiplying two large primes is computationally easy, while factoring the
resulting product is very hard. In this section, again all the explanation of the AES algorithm is advised
from the book “Understanding cryptography a textbook for students and practitioners” [10].
1.2.1 Encryption and Decryption
Both RSA encryption and decryption are performed in the integer ring Zn with modular arithmetic as the
main computation.
Encryption: Given the plaintext x, and the public key kpub = (n, e), the encryption function is
y = ekpub(x) ⌘ xe mod n
Decryption: Given the ciphertext y, and the private key kpr = (d), the decryption function is
x = dkpr (y) ⌘ yd mod n
where x, y 2 Zn
In practice, x, y, n, and d are very large integers, i.e. usually 1024 bits long or more. The value e is
called the public exponent or encryption exponent, while the private key d is called the private exponent
or decryption exponent. Based on the algorithm, here are some essential requirements for the RSA crypto-
system:
• It must be computationally infeasible to determine the private key d given the public key e and n
• The maximum bit length that could be encrypted is the size of the modulus n
• A method for fast exponentiation with long numbers is need
• For a given n, there should be many diﬀerent key pairs
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1.2.2 Detail Implementation of RSA
1.2.2.1 Key Generation
During the setup phase, the RSA public key and private key are computed as follows.
• Choose two large primes p and q
• Compute the modulus n = pq
• Compute  (n) = (p  1)(q   1)
• Select the public exponent e 2 {1, 2 . . . (n)  1} such that gcd(e, (n)) = 1
• Compute the private key d such that d ⌘ e 1 mod  (n)
1.2.2.2 Fast Exponentiation
As stated above, RSA requires a fast exponentiation method for both encryption and decryption processes.
The square-and-multiply algorithm is the most simple and commonly used for this purpose.
• Scanning the bits of the exponent H from the left (MSB) to the right (LSB)
• In every iteration, square (SQ) the current result
• If and only if the current bit is 1, multiply (MUL) the current result by the base x
In general, for an exponent H with a bit length of t+1, the numbers of operations needed are
#SQ = t, #MUL = 0.5t, #Total = 1.5t
1.2.2.3 Fast Encryption with Short Public Exponents
A surprisingly simple yet powerful trick can be used to accelerate the encryption of a message and verification
of an RSA signature is choosing the public key e. For this purpose, the public key is chosen to be a small
value with low Hamming weight. Here are the three most common values are shown in Table 1.1.
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Table 1.1: Short Public Exponents for RSA
Public key e e(in binary) #MUL + #SQ
3 11 3
17 1 0001 5
216+1 1 0000 0000 0000 0001 17
1.2.2.4 Fast Decryption with the Chinese Remainder Theorem
Unlike the public exponent, the private key d cannot be short since an attacker could simply brute-force all
the possible numbers up to a given bit length. In practice, e is often chosen to be short, while d has full bit
length. Thus, the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) is applied to accelerate RSA decryption and signature
generation. The 2 large primes, p and q, in the key generation phase are used in this transformation.
• In the first step, transformation into the CRT domain proceeds as follows.
yp ⌘ y mod p, yq ⌘ y mod q, dp ⌘ d mod (p  1), dq ⌘ d mod (q   1)
• In the second step, we compute the exponentiation in the CRT domain as follows.
xp ⌘ ydpp mod p, xq ⌘ ydqq mod q
• Finally, the inverse transformation is computed as x ⌘ qcpxp+ pcqxq mod n where the coeﬃcients are
computed as cp ⌘ q 1 mod p, cq ⌘ p 1 mod q
1.2.2.5 Finding Large Primes
During the key generation process, an important aspect is to find two large primes p and q. The general
approach is to generate integers at random then check for primality. This process depends on two important
questions, “How common are primes?” and “How fast is the primality check?”. It turns out that even for
large value, the density of primes is still suﬃciently high. In fact, the probability for a random odd number
to be prime:
P (p is prime) =
2
ln p
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Moreover, the primality tests are also computationally inexpensive. Examples are the Fermat test, the
Miller – Rabin test, and variants of them.
1.2.3 RSA in Practice
The RSA system described so far has several weaknesses.
• RSA encryption is deterministic, one-to-one mapping for a specific key
• Plaintexts x = 0, 1, 1 produce ciphertexts equal to 0, 1, -1
• Small public exponents and small plaintexts might be subject to attack
• Ciphertexts are malleable. A crypto scheme is said to be malleable if the attacker is capable of trans-
forming the ciphertext into another ciphertext which leads to a known transformation of the plaintext.
In the case of RSA, if the attacker computes a new cipher text sey with s is some integer, then the
receiver decrypts the manipulated ciphertext as (sey)d ⌘ sedxed ⌘ sx mod n. These manipulations
might do harm since the attacker is able to get s times the plaintext.
A possible solution to all these problems is the use of padding, which embeds a random structure into the
plaintext before encryption. A modern technique, Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP), for
padding RSA messages is specified and standardized in Public Key Cryptography Standard #1 (PKCS #1)
[12]. On the decryption side, the structure of the decrypted message has to be verified.
1.3 Simple Electromagnetic Analysis (SEMA) Attacks on RSA
Here are the few common attacks on the RSA.
• Protocol attacks: exploit weaknesses in the way RSA is being implemented. Many of them can be
avoided by using standard padding.
• Mathematical attacks: the best method is factoring the modulus. These attacks can be prevented by
choosing a suﬃciently large modulus.
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• Side-channel attacks: exploit information about the private key which is leaked through physical chan-
nels such as power consumption and timing behavior. This now becomes a large and active filed of
research in modern cryptography.
For this project, we apply a side-channel attack called the simple electromagnetic analysis method. The
attacker will be able to find out the private key by observing the decryption process revealed by the devices’
radiation, which is the exponential algorithm that has been demonstrated before. Therefore the attacker can
decipher the encrypted text with both the public key and the private key. The exponential algorithm has
been applied in many RSA cryptographic implementations. As the exponential algorithm has been illustrated
in the previous session, there are only 2 diﬀerent operations, square and multiply. The sequence of these
limited operations composing the private key can be revealed by visual observation of the electromagnetic
traces.
1.4 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Algorithm
The Advanced Encryption Standard Algorithm is the most widely used symmetric cipher today. The AES
block cipher is also mandatory in several industry standards and is used in many commercial systems. In
this section, all the explanation of the AES algorithm is advised from the book “Understanding cryptography
a textbook for students and practitioners” [10]. In addition, all the figures are redrawn from the ones in this
book.
1.4.1 Overview Structure
A general AES round is shown in Figure 1.1. The input x is a 128-bit block of data or plaintext. The key,
denoted by k, can be 128 bits, or 192 bits, or 256 bits. The output y is the 128-bit ciphertext.
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Figure 1.1: Basic AES Algorithm
An AES algorithm consists of several transformation rounds or cycles which convert the input plaintext
to the output ciphertext. For diﬀerent key lengths, the number of rounds varies as shown in Table 1.2. For
example, if the key length is 128 bit, there will be 10 AES rounds.
Table 1.2: Number of Rounds as a function of Key Length
Key Length Number of rounds
128 bits 10
192 bits 12
256 bits 14
The complete AES block diagram is shown below in Figure 1.2. The initial round, or round 0, consists
of only one Key Additional Layer. Next, the sequence of AES rounds is consecutively performed, taking the
output of the previous round as the current input. Each AES round consists of three so-called layers that
manipulate the input data, which are
• Byte Substitution Layer: The data is transformed nonlinearly by using a lookup table, called the S-
box, which has special mathematical properties. This nonlinear transformation causes confusion and
randomization to the data; in other words, changes in individual state bits spread quickly across data
path.
• Diﬀusion Layer: This layer provides diﬀusion over all state bits. It has two sublayers: ShiftRows
Layer, and MixColumn Layer, both of which are linear transformations. The former performs byte-
wise permutation to the data, and the latter performs matrix operation in order to mix or combine
bytes of data.
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• Key Addition Layer: the 128-bit round key or sub-key is combined with the current state by XOR
operation. The sub-key is derived from Key Schedule which will be mentioned in details later in 1.4.4.
The output of the last round is also the final output of the AES cipher. However, the last round does not
include MixColumn sublayer in the Diﬀusion Layer.
Figure 1.2: Detail Structure of an AES encryption
1.4.2 Internal Structure of AES
The internal implementation of a single round of AES is shown in Figure 1.3. First, the 128-bit plaintext is
separated into 16 bytes, from A0 to A15. Each byte is then fed into the S-Box (Byte Substitution Layer).
The 16-byte output from the S-box, from B0 to B15, is permuted byte-wise in the ShiftRows Layer. The
result is mixed and combined in the MixColumn Layer, resulting in the intermediate value, from C0 to C15.
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The intermediate value is then XORed with the 128-bit round key in the Key Addition Layer before going
to the next round.
Figure 1.3: Internal Structure of an AES round
1.4.3 Detail Implementation of each Layer
For convenience, the bytes of 16-byte input data is arranged in a 4⇥4 matrix, as shown in Figure 1.4.
Figure 1.4: Input 4⇥4 matrix
In Byte Substitution Layer, the bytes are transformed nonlinearly using the S-box, shown in Figure 1.5.
For example, if the input byte is E9 in hexadecimal, the output is the element in row number E and column
number 9, which is 1E in hexadecimal.
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Figure 1.5: Lookup Table used in Byte Substitution Layer
The detail implementation of the ShiftRows sublayer is shown in Figure 1.6. The input state, a 4⇥4
matrix from B0 to B15, is the output from the Byte Substitution Layer. To achieve the output state, the first
row of the matrix is unchanged, the second row is shifted one position to the left, the third row is shifted
two positions to the left, and the fourth row is shifted three positions to the left.
Figure 1.6: Input and Output States of the ShiftRows sub-layer
The new 4⇥4 matrix is fed into the MixColumn sublayer, and the output is calculated using the special
matrix operation employing Galois Field Properties, as shown in Figure 1.7. Each column of the output
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matrix is calculated by performing the matrix operation with the corresponding column of the input 4⇥4
matrix.
Figure 1.7: Matrix Operation in MixColumn sub-layer
Finally, the Key Addition Layer takes in two inputs: the current 16-byte state matrix, which is output
from the MixColumn sublayer, and a round key. The output is obtained by performing XOR addition of
these two inputs.
1.4.4 Key Schedule
There are diﬀerent key schedules for three AES key sizes of 126, 192, and 256 bits. As all of the schedules
are fairly similar, only the schedule for 128-bit key length will be discussed in detail. For the 128-bit key,
there are 10 rounds in the AES encryption operation. However, there is an XOR addition of key before the
first round. This means we need 11 sub-keys or round keys.
The key expansion process of an AES-128 is demonstrated in Figure 1.8. The input is the 128-bit original
key, represented as bytes from K0 through K15.Note that the key schedule is word-oriented, and the 11 sub-
keys are stored in a key expansion array as words from W[0] through W[43]. The first sub-key is obtained
by directly copying the original key from the four elements W[0], W[1], W[2], and W[3] of the array. The
remaining 10 sub-keys are computed recursively, using an XOR addition and a non-linear function g, which
will be discussed later.
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Figure 1.8: Key schedule for AES-128
As stated, function g plays an important role in sub-key derivation as it adds non-linearity to the key
schedule. It takes four input bytes and produces four-byte output, as shown in Figure 1.9. It first rotates
the input bytes, and then performs a byte-wise S-Box substitution. A round coeﬃcient (RC) is added to the
leftmost S-Box output byte. The RC value is an element of Galois field and varies from round to round.
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Figure 1.9: Function g of Round i
1.5 Diﬀerential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) Attacks on AES
The Diﬀerential Electromagnetic Analysis attack exploits the dependence of power consumption on interme-
diate values, which is very similar to the Diﬀerential Power Analysis attack [5]. Compared to the SEMA
attack, the DEMA attack has two main advantages. First, a DEMA attack doesn’t require detailed knowl-
edge about the cryptographic device. It is usually suﬃcient to know the cryptographic algorithm executed by
the device. Second, a DEMA attack works even if the recorded electromagnetic traces are extremely noisy.
Mainly, the DEMA attack analyzes the dependence of electromagnetic radiation on the processed data at
fixed moments of time. The general strategy for a DEMA attack consists of five steps.
• An intermediate result of the executed algorithm is chosen for the attack. It has to be a function of d
(plaintext or ciphertext) and k (a small part of the key).
• D diﬀerent data blocks are fed to the device for encryption or decryption, and the corresponding
electromagnetic traces are recorded. The input data blocks are denoted as a vector d = {d1, d2 . . . dD}.
The electromagnetic trace for each data block is represented as a vector ti = {ti1, ti2 . . . tiT }. Then, a
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matrix T of dimension D by T is constructed by using the recorded electromagnetic traces.
• Hypothetical intermediate values are calculated for every possible key. The key hypotheses are repre-
sented as a vector k = {k1, k2 . . . kK}. Then, the data vector d and key vector k are used to compute
intermediate values to get matrix V = [vij ], where vij = f(di, kj).
• The intermediate values in matrix V are mapped to the electromagnetic radiation values, resulting in
a new matrix H of hypothetical electromagnetic radiation values. Most common methods for doing so
are Hamming Weight Model, Hamming Distance Model and Zero Value Model.
• Hypothetical electromagnetic radiation values in matrix H are compared with the actual electromagnetic
traces. The correlation coeﬃcient between each column hi of matrix H and each column tj of matrix
T are calculated and stored in a new K⇥T correlation coeﬃcient matrix R. The correct key can be
retrieved by looking at the index of the largest correlation coeﬃcient value in the matrix R. The row
number indicates the correct key and the column number indicates the time.
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Chapter 2
Project Setting
This section discusses the experimental settings of our project, including installing the cryptography libraries,
compiling the C codes, and capturing electromagnetic traces.
2.1 Overview
The block diagram of the project setting is shown in Figure 2.1. In the center, the Intel Atom Board is
operated on UBUNTU 12.04.1 OS, connected to a keyboard and a monitor. These standard I/O devices
assist the process of writing and compiling the code. The board itself also has two USB ports, used for
copying the library installation files as well as the code from other computers. From the board, either the
serial port or the LPT port is connected to a channel of the oscilloscope in order to send the trigger, which
will be discussed later in Section §2.3. During the cryptography execution, the electromagnetic waves are
collected by a 3-loop coil antenna, with a diameter of about 1 centimeter. The antenna plus an amplifier,
which is powered 15V by power supply, can detect electromagnetic leakage traces from Intel Atom Board,
and send them directly to a channel of the oscilloscope. The scope model is WavePro 725Zi from LeCroy with
the bandwidth of 2.5GHz and the maximum sampling rate of 40 GS/sec [6]. Based on the trigger sent from
another channel, the oscilloscope is able to capture the traces from a chosen channel at the right moment,
then write to binary files, and save them to the hard disk. The trace files are then transferred to other
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computers via a USB drive in order to perform signal analysis in MATLAB.
Figure 2.1: Project Setting Block Diagram
Based on the block diagram, the actual project setting is shown in Figure 2.2. The Intel Atom Board is
in the middle, run on Linux system. To the left is the monitor and the keyboard, which are the standard I/O
connected to the board. The antenna coil with the amplifier is placed above the board in order to capture
the electromagnetic waves, and the probe is connected to the serial port, or LPT port of the board. These
placements can be seen more clearly in the close-up pictures, Figure 2.3, Figure 2.4, and Figure 2.7. Based
on the trigger from a channel, this oscilloscope will collect the electromagnetic traces of the Atom board
from another channel and save them to the hard disk. In the back is the power rail supplying for all devices,
including the monitor, the Atom board, the oscilloscope, and the power supply.
Figure 2.2: General Project Setting
A close-up view on the Intel Atom Board is shown in Figure 2.3. The board uses EMPhase S1 series flash
module for memory. To the left, the oscilloscope probe is connected to the serial port in order to detect the
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generated trigger. In the middle, the coil antenna is placed above the board and under the heat-sink to capture
the electromagnetic waves. The optimum position is chosen based on trial-and-error in order to maximize the
trace amplitudes while minimize the unexpected noise from other parts. Interestingly, the optimum positions
for the RSA and AES traces are diﬀerent, which makes sense since these two algorithms require diﬀerent
operations of the system. For these two algorithms, the coil antenna measures the electromagnetic radiations
from diﬀerent capacitors in the board.
Figure 2.3: Atom Board Setup
The amplifier of the antenna coil is connected to the power supply as shown in Figure 2.4. The amplifier
with the model number Mini-circuit ZFL-1000LN+, amplifies the signal inside the range 0.1 MHz to 1000
MHz, before it goes to the oscilloscope. This filter range is suﬃcient since the RSA and AES operations, as
later described, are in the order of 10 MHz to 100 MHz. The amplifier has a minimum gain of 20dB [8]. To
the right, the Atom board is connected to a simple button on a breadboard. This button is used to start up
or reset the whole system when necessary.
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Figure 2.4: Power Supply to the Amplifier
2.2 Writing the C Code
This section explains how we installed cryptography libraries on Linux System, and how we compiled C codes
to implement RSA and AES algorithms.
2.2.1 Employing the Libraries
In order to quickly perform the RSA and AES algorithms, it is convenient to employ free public libraries
inside the C code. For this project, two popular libraries are chosen: the GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic
(GMP) library version 5.1.0 [13], and the OpenSSL library version 1.0.1c [9]. The GMP library is well-
known for the speed when dealing with long integers (bignum) using highly optimized assembly language;
thus, it will be used to implement the RSA algorithm, both simple multiply-and-square method and modular
exponentiation method. The OpenSSL library is an open-source implementation of the SSL and TLS protocol,
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which implements many basic cryptography functions. Hence, the library consists of both RSA and AES
implementations.
These two library packages can be downloaded from their main websites. The installation process is also
simple. Here is an example of installing the OpenSSL library. The first step is to extract files from the
downloaded package. The second step is to enter the directory where the package is extracted, and to run
the configuration file with the default setup. Next step is to compile OpenSSL and to check for any error
messages. The last step is to install the OpenSSL library with root command for privileges on destination
directory.
tar -xvzf OpenSSL-1.0.1c.tar.gz
./config
make
sudo make install
Now, the library is ready to be used by including the library header in the beginning of the C code, for
example:
#include <OpenSSL/aes.h>
2.2.2 Compiling the Code
Since the compiler of the system doesn’t link the library automatically, we have to specify the library directory
manually in each compilation. To compile the code using the GMP library, use the command:
gcc -I/usr/local/include test.c /usr/local/lib/libgmp.a
To compile the C code using the OpenSSL library, use the command:
gcc -I/usr/local/ssl/include test.c /usr/local/ssl/lib/libcrypto.a
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2.3 Generating Triggers
Generating the trigger is a very important factor in the process of capturing the electromagnetic traces
since the oscilloscope need to be triggered based on one of its channel inputs. For both RSA and AES
implementations, the atom board first generates the trigger at one of its output port. Since there is always a
rising time at the output port when going from low to high, the board is forced to sleep or to perform some
delay to accommodate this latency. Then, the cryptographic algorithm is performed, followed by another
delay period, either sleeping or counting. The procedure ensures that the whole cryptographic algorithm is
captured in the electromagnetic trace, and reduces the interference between two consecutive operations.
2.3.1 From the Serial Port
Since the serial port is quite common in many systems and easy to be written to, we use it as the trigger
when capturing the RSA electromagnetic traces. The oscilloscope probe is connected to the serial port as
shown in Figure 2.5. The ground is connected to the pin 6 while the probe is connected to the pin 3 of the
serial COM port.
Figure 2.5: Probe at the Serial COM Port
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At the beginning of the code, we perform test I/O for this specific port using the command:
fd = open("/dev/ttyS0", O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY|O_NDELAY);
Next, every time a trigger is needed, we just have to write a single bit 1 to that port:
write(fd,tpstr,1);
After a finite time, the output port is back to 0; thus, we don’t have to manually turn oﬀ the port before
the next trigger. The trigger produced at this serial port is shown in Figure 2.6. Since the oscilloscope is set
with 1µs per division, the trigger rising time is about 0.75µs, which is significantly slow. However, since the
RSA algorithm itself is slow as well, in an order of 10 milliseconds, it is still acceptable to use this trigger
when collecting the RSA traces.
Figure 2.6: Trigger Produced at the Serial Port
2.3.2 From the LPT Port
Since a single AES takes about 1.2 µs, the trigger from the serial port, which has a latency of about 0.75µs,
is not suﬃcient. Instead, we need a very fast trigger to capture the AES on the oscilloscope. We researched
about Intel Atom Board [3] in order to find a port that can produce a trigger with fast rising time. Finally,
we came up with the conclusion of using the LPT (Parallel) port. Although LVDS (low voltage diﬀerential
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signal) port and LPC (low pin count) seem promising as they potentially have lower latencies, producing a
trigger at those ports may be diﬃcult due to involving low-level programming such as changing the kernel,
and bios setting.
The oscilloscope probe is connected to the data pin of the LPT port as shown in Figure 2.7. The ground
is still connected to the pin 6 of the serial COM port while the probe is connected to any pin of the LPT
port.
Figure 2.7: Probe at the LPT Port
To write to the data bits of the LPT port, a general procedure is implemented in C. First, the base port
address is defined as below:
#define BASEPORT 0x378 /*lp1*/
Next, we have to set the permission to access the port:
if (ioperm(BASEPORT, 3, 1)) {perror("ioperm"); exit(1);}
Inside the main function, whenever a trigger is needed, we just have to write a sequence of 1 to the chosen
port:
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outb(255, BASEPORT);
However, since the LPT port doesn’t go back to 0 after a finite time, we have to manually set it oﬀ:
outb(0, BASEPORT);
Finally, for our own safety, we have to take away the permission to access the LPT port at the end of main
function in case other codes use the port for diﬀerent purposes.
if (ioperm(BASEPORT, 3, 0)) {perror("ioperm"); exit(1);}
The trigger produced at this LPT port is shown in Figure 2.8. The oscilloscope is still set with 1µs per
division, and as seen, the slope now is much steeper. The latency is only about 0.05µs, which is acceptable
to use as the trigger when collecting the AES traces.
Figure 2.8: Trigger Produced at LPT port
2.4 Capturing the Traces
In order to successfully capture the interested electromagnetic trace, the scope setup has to be strictly
followed. First step is to set up the trigger signal, which can be in any channel. In this case, we chose channel
3, with a positive edge trigger. Detail options are shown in Figure 2.9.
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Figure 2.9: Trigger Channel Setup
Next step is to set up the trace signal, which in this case is chosen to be channel 1. The channel is coupling
with AC1MW, and the bandwidth is set to 200 MHz, which is enough to cover the RSA and AES operations.
Figure 2.10: Trace Channel Setup
The final step is to set up the appropriate sampling rate in order to capture the whole operation in a
single trace. For example, for the RSA 1024-bit key, the sampling rate needs to be 200MS/sec. For shorter or
longer key length, the sampling rate would be modified accordingly to accomodate the new RSA operation.
Sine the AES operations are really fast, the sampling rate can be set to the maximum of 20GS/sec. The
location of the coil attena is chosen to minimize the noises inside each trace. Examples of capturing the RSA
and AES traces are shown in Figure 2.11. Finally, press Save to record the wanted traces into binary files,
and to later use them for the MATLAB analysis.
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Figure 2.11: Oscilloscope sampling setup for RSA (top) and AES (bottom)
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Chapter 3
Attacking RSA
3.1 General Procedure of Analyzing RSA Electromagnetic Traces
This section explains the standard procedure of collecting, filtering, and processing traces to clear unwanted
noises and other operations of the system.
3.1.1 Collecting the Traces
As stated, we first set a trigger at the serial port, perform a sleep command, run one RSA operation, and
then another sleep command. As the Atom Board executes this procedure over and over again in a loop,
the oscilloscope records the traces based on the intended trigger. For each trace, general information of the
key, the crypto algorithm, the library, and the scope setting are also recorded. An example trace is shown in
Figure 3.1.
• Trace name: sim80_2.5G_2.trc
• RSA Key: 80 bits (FFFF0000FFFF0000FFFF )
• RSA algorithm: Simple multiply-and-square, GMP library
• Sampling frequency: 2.5 GS/sec
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Figure 3.1: Original RSA Trace with 80 bit exponent (sim80_2.5G_2.trc)
Despite the noises, we can see the RSA operation in the middle of the trace, represented by the region
with higher amplitude. The two regions with lower amplitude are when the board is performing the sleep
commands. However, we cannot see any pattern of multiply and square operations in this raw trace; thus,
filtering techniques are required in order to clear out unexpected factors from this trace.
3.1.2 Filtering Technique
Our SEMA attack on RSA utilizes two filters, and now we will describe the concept behind these filters in
details. Since there are a lot of noises as well as other system operations running during the cryptography
execution, an appropriate band-pass is employed to amplify only the signal inside the range of the interested
operations, i.e. RSA or AES. This would be the first filter applied to the collected traces.
The electromagnetic radiation of the target device could be given as p(t) = Pconst + pdyn(t) where Pconst
is the constant part and pdyn(t) is the dynamic part caused by internal operations. Usually, the dynamic
portion is much weaker than the constant part. Thus, the possibility of exploiting leakage heavily depends
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on the quality of the isolation of pdyn(t).
Since the amplitude of the signal is modulated as s(t) = p(t) cos(!rt) where !r is the carrier frequency,
the extraction of p(t) or the weak dynamic portion pdyn(t) could be done using amplitude demodulation.
In this project, a very common incoherent technique is employed, which based on rectification, or often
called envelope detection. Here is a quick explanation of the method. Let first denote the frequency domain
representation of the original signal as A(j!) = F {p(t)}. Now the spectrum of the rectified signal could be
computed [11].
F {|s(t)|} = F {p(t) |cos (!rt)|} = F
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Thus, the rectified signal is essentially similar to the spectrum of p(t), which however is scaled and repeated
at all even multiples of the carrier frequency. Finally, an appropriate band-pass filter at low frequency is
employed to isolate the desire signal p(t) .
3.1.3 Filtering the Traces in MATLAB
The first step is to plot the spectrogram of the electromagnetic trace, as shown in Figure 3.2, in order to find
which frequency range the RSA operations execute at. The spectrogram function is available in the MATLAB
Signal Processing Toolbox, and the detail script of plotting the spectrogram can be found in the Appendix.
Since we add two sleep commands at the beginning and at the end, the RSA operation is expected to stand
out clearly.
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Figure 3.2: Spectrogram of the original trace (sim80_2.5G_2.trc)
As seen, the x-axis is the time in second, the y-axis is the frequency in Hz, and the color at each point
represents the amplitude of the specific frequency at the specific time. Based on the spectrogram, we can
observe several basic operations of the system, which can be seen as continuous red stripes from the beginning
until the end. In other hand, since our RSA operation is set between two sleep commands, it would stand out
as a single red stripe but be truncated at the two ends. Applying this concept to the current spectrogram,
the RSA operation is the red stripe ranging from 50 MHz to 80 MHz. Moreover, noise can be seen as red
spots appearing randomly in the spectrogram. Therefore, the first bandpass filter is chosen to be from 50
MHz to 80 MHz. This filter will attenuate the undesired noise as well as other operations performed by the
Atom board during the experiment. The trace after the first filter is shown in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: Trace after the 1st filter (sim80_2.5G_2.trc)
As expected, the first filter successfully reduces the noise and other operations of the system. The trace
amplitude during RSA operation is much higher than the amplitude during sleep time. Also, the overall
amplitude is more uniform. However, as mentioned in 3.1.2, the weak dynamic portion pdyn(t) has to be
extracted using amplitude demodulation in order to exploit the information leakage. Therefore, the next
step is the envelope detection based on rectification, which removes the carrier frequency from the current
trace. After that, the multiply and square operations can be seen and diﬀerentiated much more easily.
Unfortunately, since the carrier frequency is unknown, we first have to take the absolute value of the trace,
which shifts the spectrum center to DC, and then plot the new spectrum in order to obtain some insights
about the carrier frequency. The new spectrum is shown in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: Spectrum of the rectified trace (sim80_2.5G_2.trc)
The spectrum of the rectified trace consists of a huge spike at DC and several smaller spikes around; one
of them would be the carrier frequency we are looking for. By trial-and-error, we find out the closest spikes
to DC, near 40 kHz, is the interested one. Thus, a second bandpass filter is set from 20 kHz to 40 kHz in
order to remove the carrier frequency, and the new trace is shown in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Trace after the 2nd filter (sim80_2.5G_2.trc)
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3.1.4 Finding the Key
After the envelope detection process, each operation can be visually identified clearly. In this case, the upper
peaks are diﬀerent for the multiply and square operations, and will become the distinguisher. A longer peak
represents a multiply operation while a shorter one represents a square operation. It is convenient to do the
diﬀerentiation procedure automatically in MATLAB. First, we have to cut out the RSA part, perform the
peak detection, and then use clustering method to separate between multiply and square operations. For
visualization purpose, we draw letter M in red representing a multiply, and letter S in green representing a
square near each peak. The processed trace with M and S displayed is shown in Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.6: Automatically distinguish between MUL and SQ
Finally, the sequence multiply and square can be converted to the RSA key of interest. Since this trace
employs the multiply-and-square method, a square followed by of multiply corresponds to a single bit 1, while
a single square corresponds to a single bit 0. Again, a MATLAB script is deployed to automatically convert
the multiply-and-square sequence to a binary key. The script returns the key FFFF0000FFFF0000FFFF in
hexadecimal. Knowing the original key, we can then evaluate the performance of our method based on the
bit error rate, which is computed by XOR-ing the received key with the original one. In this case, the bit
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error rate is zero; we successfully retrieve the secret key from the collected electromagnetic trace.
3.2 Simple Multiply-and-Square RSA
In this part, we employ the C code that implements a simple multiply-and-square RSA algorithm using the
GMP library. Basically, the board scans the bits of the exponent from the left (MSB) to the right (LSB).
In every iteration, it squares the current result. If and only if the current bit is 1, it multiplies the current
result by the base. The complete C code can be found under the Appendix. Here we use a 1024 bit key, a
standard key length for RSA. Using the trigger from the serial port, we can collect the electromagnetic traces
and then start the analysis. Below is the general information of the trace, and the trace itself is shown in the
top part of Figure 3.7.
• Trace name: sim1024_250M_2.trc
• RSA Key: 1024 bits {FA0BFC0DFE09F807F60543210 (x10)F (x6)}
• RSA algorithm: Simple multiply-and-square, GMP library
• Sampling frequency: 250 MS/sec
Following the general filtering procedure, we first plot the spectrogram of the received electromagnetic
trace to determine the frequency range of RSA algorithm. As usual, the RSA operation stands out clearly
compared to the sleep time, ranging from 50 MHz to 80 MHz. Thus, we use these parameters as the first
bandpass filter for the received trace. The result trace is shown in the middle part of Figure 3.7.
As seen, the trace is now much clearer and more uniform; the amplitude during RSA operation is much
higher than the amplitude during sleep time. Next step is envelope detection, which removes the carrier
frequency from the electromagnetic trace. We have to rectify the trace and then plot the spectrum to find
the frequency of interest. Similarly, the spikes near 40 kHz is the one we are looking for. Thus, the second
bandpass filter is chosen from 20 kHz to 40 kHz, the result trace after this filter is shown in the bottom part
of Figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.7: Simple RSA 1024 bit traces: Top - Raw trace. Middle - After the 1st filter. Bottom - After the
2nd filter (sim1024_250M_2.trc)
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The multiply and square operations are now much clearer. In this case, the lower peaks are diﬀerent for
the multiply and square operations, and will become the distinguisher. A deeper peak represents a multiply
operation while a shorter one represents a square operation. It is convenient to do the diﬀerentiation procedure
automatically in MATLAB. First, we have to cut out the RSA part, perform the peak detection, and then
use clustering method to separate between multiply and square operation. The detail MATLAB script can be
found in the Appendix. The peak heights are shown in the scatter plot, Figure 3.8. With clustering method,
the script automatically separates the multiply operations in red and the square operations in blue.
Figure 3.8: Distinguish between MUL (red) and SQ (blue)
Next, the sequence of multiply and square operations can be converted to the RSA key of interest. Since
this trace employs the multiply-and-square method, a square followed by of multiply corresponds to a single
bit 1, while a single square corresponds to a single bit 0. Again, a MATLAB script is deployed to automatically
convert the multiply-and-square sequence to a binary key. Then, the reconstructed key is plotted with red
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stars together with the original key, which is plotted in blue lines, as shown in Figure 3.9.
Figure 3.9: Reconstructed key vs. Original key(sim256_250M_2.trc)
As seen, the reconstructed key matches with the original one really well. However, we have to make several
small oﬀset adjustments due to the sliding between 0 and 1 since bit 0 corresponds to a single operation while
bit 1 corresponds to two consecutive operations. The bit error rate is pretty small, only about 4%, which
mostly came from the noise and the unexpected behaviors of the board. Performing the attack several times
and calculating the key based on the majority rule can help us to improve the bit error rate.
3.3 Modular Exponentiation (RSA) - GMP Library
In this part, we perform an attack on the RSA algorithm of the GMP library, in particular, the modular
exponentiation function. Instead of the simple multiply-and-square method, this library employs the sliding
window algorithm. Generally, sliding window exponentiation computes the power by looking at a number
of exponent bits at a time, called the window size. Diﬀerent from the simple method, the sliding window
method requires pre-computation of several values.
First step is to compute x2 from the plain text x. Next, the system consecutively computes x3, x5, up
until x2k 1 where k is the window size. These values will be used for the multiplications in the next part.
Similar to the simple multiply-and-square method, the exponent bits are scanned from left to right. If the
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bit is 0, the current value is squared. Otherwise, if the bit is 1, the system finds the longest bit-string whose
length is less than or equal to the window size, and the ending-bit is also 1. This bit-string will equal to
one of the pre-computed values from the previous part; and the current value is multiplied directly with this
bit-string. After scanning all the exponent bits, the final exponentiation is returned.
Despite the extra time at the beginning due to the pre-computations, the sliding window exponentiation
is much faster the simple one. Multiplying with a stored bit-string instead of a base only saves a lot of
computation time. The goal of our attack is still to distinguish between multiply and square operations;
however, we might have to make an additional eﬀort to separate between multiplying of diﬀerent bit-string
values. Otherwise, there would be several unknown bits inside the reconstructed key. For each multiplication,
only the first bit and the last bit in the window is ensured to equal 1, while the middle bits could either be
0 or 1.
3.3.1 Diﬀerent Key Sizes
As expected, the GMP library employs diﬀerent window sizes for diﬀerent RSA key lengths. In this section,
we explore the window size as well as the number of pre-computations as a function of the key length. For
the convenience, the key is chosen to be consisting of just FFFFF and 00000 in order to quickly identify the
window size on the filtered traces. A sequence of consecutive 1’s makes sure the system to always use the
maximum of its window size; and a sequence of consecutive 0’s helps to distinguish the multiply and square
operations. The same two-stage filtering process is applied for all the collected traces in order to remove the
unwanted factors such as noise, other operations, and carrier frequency. After that, we have to look into the
source code to verify our window size result.
3.3.1.1 80-bit key
We start with a 80-bit key RSA, and the general information of the trace is shown below. Similarly, the
two-stage filter is applied and the result trace is shown in Figure 3.10. Since this is a short key, a small
window size and a few number of pre-computations are expected.
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• Trace name: gmp80_2.5G_1.trc
• RSA Key: 80 bits {FFFF0000FFFF0000FFFF}
• RSA algorithm: Sliding window, GMP library
• Sampling frequency: 2.5 GS/sec
Figure 3.10: 80-bit key RSA filtered trace - GMP library
Based on the sequence of 0’s, we conclude that the lower peaks are the distinguisher between diﬀerent
operations. A deeper spike represents a square operation while a shorter one represents a multiply operation.
During the sequence of 1’s, we can see three square operations followed by a multiply operation; thus, the
window size is 3. In the beginning of the traces, there are 3 multiply operations, which is unusual since they
never stand next to each other due to the algorithm. However, these are the 3 pre-computations, calculating
x3, x5, up until x7.
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3.3.1.2 200-bit key
This part deals with a 200-bit key RSA, with the general trace information shown below. Similarly, the
two-stage filter is employed, and the result trace is shown in Figure 3.11. Since this is a longer key than
before, we expect a larger window size and a more number of pre-computations at the beginning.
• Trace name: gmp200_1G_1.trc
• RSA Key: 200 bits {FFFFF00000FFFFF00000...}
• RSA algorithm: Sliding window, GMP library
• Sampling frequency: 1 GS/sec
Figure 3.11: 200-bit key RSA filtered trace - GMP library
Based on the trace structure, we know that the lower peaks are still the distinguisher between diﬀerent
operations. A deeper spike represents a square operation while a shorter one represents a multiply operation.
However, the diﬀerences are not as clear as in the case of 80-bit key. During the sequence of 1’s, we can see
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four square operations followed by a multiply operation; thus, the window size is 4. In the beginning of the
traces, there are 7 multiply operations, and these are the 7 pre-computations, calculating x3, x5, up until
x15.
3.3.1.3 400-bit key
This part explores a 400-bit key RSA, with the general trace information shown below. Again, the two-stage
filter is used to remove unwanted factors, and the result trace is shown in Figure 3.12. Since this is an even
longer key than before, a larger window size and a more number of pre-computations at the beginning are a
reasonable assumption.
• Trace name: gmp400_1G_1.trc
• RSA Key: 400 bits {FFFFF00000FFFFF00000...}
• RSA algorithm: Sliding window, GMP library
• Sampling frequency: 1 GS/sec
Figure 3.12: 400-bit key RSA filtered trace - GMP library
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Exploring the trace structure, we conclude that the lower peaks are still the distinguisher between diﬀerent
operations. However, a deeper spike now represents a multiply operation while a shorter one represents a
square operation. The diﬀerence might be resulted from the parameter of the two filters, or from the diﬀerent
sampling rate of the oscilloscope. Moreover, the diﬀerences are as clear as in the case of 80-bit key. During
the sequence of 1’s, we can see five square operations followed by a multiply operation; thus, the window size
is 5. In the beginning of the traces, there are 15 pre-computations, calculating x3, x5, up until x31.
3.3.1.4 1024-bit key
Finally, we look at a 1024-bit key RSA, which is a very common key length, and the general trace information
is shown below. Again, the two-stage filter is used to remove unwanted factors, and the result trace is shown
in Figure 3.13. Since this is a really long key, a large window size and a big number of pre-computations at
the beginning will be our assumption.
Figure 3.13: 1024-bit key RSA filtered trace - GMP library
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• Trace name: gmp1024_250M_1.trc
• RSA Key: 1024 bits {FFFFF00000FFFFF00000 . . . }
• RSA algorithm: Sliding window, GMP library
• Sampling frequency: 250 MS/sec
Based on the trace structure, we know that the lower peaks are still the distinguisher between diﬀerent
operations. Similar to the case of 400-bit key, a deeper spike represents a multiply operation while a shorter
one represents a square operation, and the diﬀerences are very clear. During the sequence of 1’s, we can see
six square operations followed by a multiply operation; thus, the window size is 6. Moreover, 6 is also the
maximum window size of the modular exponentiation in the GMP library. In the beginning of the traces,
there are 31 pre-computations, calculating x3, x5, up until x63.
3.3.2 Summary
In conclusion, the window size and the number of pre-calculations vary as a function of the key length. The
longer the key, the larger the window size in order to compute the exponentiation eﬃciently. The library fixes
the maximum window size of 6; thus, for standard RSA keys, either 1024 bits or 2048 bits, the window size
would always be 6. Moreover, for a window size of n, the number of pre-computations required is 2n 1   1.
Table 3.1 shows the measurements we made to verify the window size of the sliding window method.
Table 3.1: Window size and Pre-computations - GMP Library
Key length Window size # Pre-computations
80 3 (verified) 3
200 4 (verified) 7
400 5 (verified) 15
1024 6 (verified) 31
Right now, we successfully distinguish the multiply and square operations in the electromagnetic traces.
In the cases of 80-bit key and 200-bit, the square operation has higher amplitude than the multiply one,
but in the other cases, the multiply operation has higher amplitude than the square one. The diﬀerence
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might be resulted diﬀerent sampling rate of the oscilloscope. As the key gets longer, the sampling rate is
reduced appropriately to fit the whole RSA key on the oscilloscope screen, which results to the change in the
parameter of the two filters. These modifications aﬀect the amplitude of the multiply and square operations.
However, the sliding window method has diﬀerent types of multiplications, which results in several un-
known bits in the middle of the window. As the key gets longer, the number of diﬀerent types of multipli-
cations, which equals the number of pre-calculations, increases. It means that recovering the full key is even
more challenging and time-consuming. We are still in the process of finding a method that can distinguish
the diﬀerent multiplications in order to uncover all the unknown bits in the reconstructed key.
3.4 Modular Exponentiation (RSA) – OpenSSL library
In this part, we perform an attack on the modular exponentiation algorithm of the OpenSSL library. For-
tunately, the library also employs the sliding window algorithm, similar to the GMP library; thus, we are
able to diﬀerentiate the multiply and square operations using the same procedure. In addition, the OpenSSL
library employs Montgomery reduction to deal with modular arithmetic, which can enhance the execution
time significantly. Therefore, we expect to observe the filtered traces with the same strutter as in the GMP
library but with shorter execution time due to the additional improved algorithm.
3.4.1 Diﬀerent Key Sizes
Similar to the GMP library, the OpenSSL library employs diﬀerent window sizes for diﬀerent RSA key lengths.
In this section, we explore the window size as well as the number of pre-computations as a function of the
key length. For the convenience, the key is chosen to be consisting of just FFFFF and 00000 in order to
quickly identify the window size on the filtered traces. A sequence of consecutive 1’s makes sure the system
to always use the maximum of its window size; and a sequence of consecutive 0’s helps to distinguish the
multiply and square operations. The same two-stage filtering process is applied for all the collected traces in
order to remove the unwanted factors such as noise, other operations, and carrier frequency.
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3.4.1.1 80-bit key
We start with a 80-bit key RSA, and the general information of the trace is shown below. Similarly, the
two-stage filter is applied and the result trace is shown in Figure 3.14. Since this is a short key, a small
window size and a few number of pre-computations are expected.
• Trace name: open80_2.5G.trc
• RSA Key: 80 bits {FFFF0000FFFF0000FFFF}
• RSA algorithm: Sliding window, OpenSSL library
• Sampling frequency: 2.5 GS/sec
Figure 3.14: 80-bit key RSA filtered trace - OpenSSL library
Based on the sequence of 0’s, we conclude that the upper peaks are the distinguisher between diﬀerent
operations. A higher and wider spike represents a multiply operation while a shorter one represents a square
operation. However, the filtered trace is not as uniform as the trace of GMP library; thus, it is more diﬃcult
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to identify each operation. During the sequence of 1’s, we can see four square operations followed by a
multiply operation; thus, the window size is 4. In the beginning of the traces, there are 7 high spikes, which
are the 7 pre-computations when calculating x3, x5, up until x15.
3.4.1.2 320-bit key
This part deals with a 320-bit key RSA, with the general trace information shown below. Similarly, the
two-stage filter is employed, and the result trace is shown in Figure 3.15. Since this is a longer key than
before, we expect a larger window size and a more number of pre-computations at the beginning.
• Trace name: open320_2.5G_1.trc
• RSA Key: 320 bits {FFFFF00000FFFFF00000 . . . }
• RSA algorithm: Sliding window, OpenSSL library
• Sampling frequency: 1 GS/sec
Figure 3.15: 320-bit key RSA filtered trace - OpenSSL library
47
Based on the trace structure, we know that the upper peaks are still the distinguisher between diﬀerent
operations. A shorter spike represents a square operation while a higher and wider one represents a multiply
operation. However, the diﬀerences are clearer than in the case of 80-bit key. During the sequence of 1’s, we
can see five square operations followed by a multiply operation; thus, the window size is 5. In the beginning
of the traces, there are 15 multiply operations, and these are the 15 pre-computations, calculating x3, x5, up
until x31.
3.4.1.3 1024-bit key
Finally, we look at a 1024-bit key RSA, which is a very common key length, and the general trace information
is shown below. Again, the two-stage filter is used to remove unwanted factors, and the result trace is shown
in Figure 3.16. Since this is a really long key, a large window size and a big number of pre-computations at
the beginning will be our assumption.
Figure 3.16: 1024-bit key RSA filtered trace - OpenSSL library
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• Trace name: open1024_250M.trc
• RSA Key: 1024 bits {FFFFF00000FFFFF00000 . . . }
• RSA algorithm: Sliding window, OpenSSL library
• Sampling frequency: 250 MS/sec
Based on the trace structure, we know that the upper peaks are still the distinguisher between diﬀerent
operations. Similar to the case of 320-bit key, a shorter spike represents a square operation while a higher
and wider one represents a multiply operation, and the diﬀerences are very clear. During the sequence of 1’s,
we can see six square operations followed by a multiply operation; thus, the window size is 6. Moreover, 6 is
also the maximum window size of the modular exponentiation in the OpenSSL library. In the beginning of
the traces, there are 31 pre-computations, calculating x3, x5, up until x63.
3.4.2 Summary
In conclusion, the window size and the number of pre-calculations vary as a function of the key length. The
longer the key, the larger the window size in order to compute the exponentiation eﬃciently. The library fixes
the maximum window size of 6; thus, for standard RSA keys, either 1024 bits or 2048 bits, the window size
would always be 6. Moreover, for a window size of n, the number of pre-computations required is 2n 1   1.
Table 3.2 shows the measurements we made to verify the window size.
Table 3.2: Window size and Pre-computations - OpenSSL Library
Key Length Window size # Pre-computations
80 4 (verified) 7
320 5 (verified) 15
1024 6 (verified) 31
Right now, we successfully distinguish the multiply and square operations in the electromagnetic traces.
However, we are facing the same problem as in using GMP library. Diﬀerent types of multiplications result
in several unknown bits in the middle of the window, which makes the process of recovering the full key to be
diﬃcult and time-consuming. Our goal is to find a method that can distinguish the diﬀerent multiplications
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in order to uncover all the unknown bits in the reconstructed key.
3.5 Comparing RSA Methods
We have introduced and performed attacks on three diﬀerent implementations of RSA algorithm, from really
simple to more complex. First method is the simple multiply-and-square algorithm using the GMP library.
It scans the exponent bit from left to right and carries out the multiply and square operations accordingly.
This method is faster than the brute-force exponentiation but still really slow. The second method, sliding
window algorithm of the GMP library, is more eﬃcient. It still scans the exponent bit from left to right,
and squares the value if the current bit is 0. However, when the current bit is 1, the system multiplies the
value with a pre-computed values. The second method is quite an improvement, about one and a half time
faster than the first method. The OpenSSL library also employs the sliding window algorithm but with
an additional Montgomery reduction to handle modular arithmetic. Thus, the third method is much more
eﬃcient than the other two, approximately doubling the speed of the second method. Table 3.3 summarizes
the average execution time of three RSA methods performing on the same 1024-bit RSA key.
Table 3.3: Comparing RSA execution time for 1024-bit key
RSA method Average execution time
Simple multiply-and-square 32 ms
Modular Exponentiation (GMP) 22 ms
Modular Exponentiation(OpenSSL) 12 ms
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Chapter 4
Attacking AES
4.1 Collecting the AES traces
The complete C code to generate AES operations can be found in the Appendix. As stated in 2.3.2, we have
to use LPT port as a trigger source in collecting AES electromagnetic traces due to the fast operation of
AES encryption. We first set the LPTs port to high, which indicates the start of the trigger.
outb(255, BASEPORT);
Then, two AES encryptions are performed with the same plaintext. With this method, it would be easier to
recognize the AES structure inside the collected traces.
AES_encrypt(out, temp, &ke);
AES_encrypt(out, out, &ke);
After these encryptions, we signal the end of the trigger by setting LPT port to low, ready for the next
trigger.
outb(0, BASEPORT);
The system is then start a counter, which is necessary to allow enough delay for the oscilloscope between two
successive triggers.
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for (j=0; j<1048576; j++);
Next, we employ a while loop to automatically generate a thousand AES traces on the scope. The previous
ciphertext will become plaintext for the next AES operation. Besides, we incorporate print functions to
record the plaintext and ciphertext pair of each trace that we collect in a separate text file, which will be
useful for the Diﬀerential Electromagnetic Analysis later. The electromagnetic traces are saved in the binary
file format, with the general information recorded. Figure 4.1 shows a sample AES trace file captured.
• Trace names: from aes_000.trc to aes_999.trc
• AES Key: 128 bits (010000...000001 )
• AES algorithm: OpenSSL library
• Sampling frequency: 20 GS/sec
Figure 4.1: A sample AES trace
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4.2 Filtering the AES traces
Before performing the DEMA attack, we have to filter them in order to clear out unwanted noises and
other operations of the system. The complete MATLAB script for the filtering process can be found in the
Appendix. In the raw traces, we can observe significant noise spikes. However, we can see a distinguishable
pattern between samples of around 2E4 and 8E4, which we assume to be the region of two AES encryptions.
Figure 4.2 shows the processed raw trace after the extraction of the estimated AES region.
Figure 4.2: Extracted AES region from the raw trace
The trace is now much clearer with the AES operation standing out in the middle. However, there are
still a lot of noise spikes in all over the trace. The next step is to plot the spectrum of the electromagnetic
trace, as shown in Figure 4.3, in order to find which frequency range the AES operations execute at. Then
a bandpass filter can be applied to minimize the noise component and other operations in the trace.
53
Figure 4.3: Frequency Spectrum Plot of Raw AES
As seen, there are two very high and narrow spikes in 100 MHz and 170 MHz, which represent the
other system operations. There are also many frequency spikes resulting from noises. The AES spectrum is
estimated to be between 50MHz and 85MHz, represented by a medium clustering spike. These parameters
then become the frequency range for our bandpass filter. Figure 4.4 shows the AES trace after applying this
filter.
Figure 4.4: Filtered AES
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As expected, the filter successfully reduces the noise and other operations of the system. The trace
amplitude during RSA operation is much higher than the amplitude during counter time. Since we run
two AES encryptions with each trigger, we expect the two similar structures separated by a significant spike
between the two AES operations. Thus, the second AES operation is extracted in order to perform the DEMA
attack. The process is accomplished using MATLAB peak detection function. Since the AES operations is
started and ended with very high peaks, the index of the last peak will be used as a termination point to cut
the second AES. For uniform purpose between the AES traces, the 15,000 samples before the last peak are
extracted to represent the second AES operation, and the new extracted traces are downsampled by a factor
of 16. Figure 4.5 shows the final traces, which has only around 1000 samples.
Figure 4.5: Extracted AES Operation
The same process is repeated for all 1000 traces in MATLAB, and nine diﬀerent AES operations are
chosen to show in Figure 4.6. As seen, the same structure can be seen in any AES operation, though the
peak locations and heights vary from trace to trace. We managed to make a decent alignment for all collected
traces, and hope to be able to perform a DEMA attack on these traces. Finally, the trace data is saved as
text files, as shown in Figure 4.7. Each text file contains two columns. The first column is the index, and
the second column is the corresponding amplitude of the trace.
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Figure 4.6: Nine diﬀerent AES operations
Figure 4.7: Downsampled AES written into Text Files
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4.3 Diﬀerential Electromagnetic Analysis on the AES Traces
The complete MATLAB script for the DEMA attack can be found in the Appendix. First, an intermediate
result of the executed algorithm is chosen for the attack. It has to be a function of d (plaintext or ciphertext)
and k (a small part of the key). In this case, we chose the intermediate value y after the first S-box:
y = f(x, k) = Sbox(x  k).
Figure 4.8: Intermediate value y after the first S-box
Here we have D = 20,000 diﬀerent data blocks are fed to the device for encryption, and the corresponding
electromagnetic traces are recorded. The input data blocks are denoted as a vector d = {d1, d2 . . . dD}. The
electromagnetic trace for each data block is represented as a vector ti = {ti1, ti2 . . . tiT }, which is stored in
each binary trace file. Then, a matrix T of dimension D by T is constructed by stacking the recorded AES
traces.
T =
266664
t1
...
tD
377775 =
266664
t11 · · · t1T
...
. . .
...
tD1 · · · tDT
377775
All AES traces are plotted together, as shown in Figure 4.9.
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Figure 4.9: All electromagnetic traces
Next, hypothetical intermediate values are calculated for every possible key. The key hypotheses are
represented as a vector k = {k1, k2 . . . kK}. Then, the data vector d and key vector k are used to compute
intermediate values to get the matrix V = [vij ], where vij = f(di, kj) = Sbox(di   kj).
V =
266664
v11 · · · v1T
...
. . .
...
vD1 · · · vDT
377775
After that, the intermediate values in matrix V are mapped to the electromagnetic radiation values,
resulting in a new matrix H of hypothetical electromagnetic radiation values. Most common methods for
doing so are Hamming Weight model, Hamming Distance model and Zero Value model. In this case, we first
apply the Hamming Weight model leading to H = HW(V ). Finally, hypothetical power consumption values
in matrix H are compared with the actual power traces. The correlation coeﬃcient between each column hi
of matrix H and each column tj of matrix T are calculated and stored in a new K×T correlation coeﬃcient
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matrix R, with rij = corr(hi, tj) .
R =
266664
r11 · · · r1T
...
. . .
...
rD1 · · · rDT
377775
Correlation coeﬃcient values for all 256 possible keys are plotted as shown in Figure 4.10.
Figure 4.10: Correlation values for 256 possible keys
Unfortunately, we cannot find any leakage from the collected traces; thus, the secret key cannot be
identified. After that, we have tried several approaches to improve our diﬀerential attack such as increasing
the number of traces to 50,000, or cutting out the first AES operation instead of the second one. Diﬀerent
models like Hamming distance, or a single bit are employed but with no success.
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4.4 Summary
We believe that the issues regarding AES analysis are alignment of the AES encryptions in diﬀerent traces,
and the inaccuracy of the trigger from the Atom Board. To successfully retrieve the correct AES key, the
AES encryptions in electromagnetic traces need to be perfectly aligned. Currently, we use peak detection to
align the AES encryptions. Since the peaks themselves are precarious, we might need to find a more reliable
way to correctly align the encryptions. Another problem is the inaccuracy of the trigger. In this project,
we collected thousands of AES traces automatically using the trigger. In C code implementation of the AES
encryptions, a trigger is produced for each encryption. The oscilloscope is set to collect an electromagnetic
trace at each trigger. We believe that wrong trigger events are caused by noise. These additional triggers
cause a mismatch between the trace and the coresponding input (plaintext). Such a mismatch can render
all subsequent traces useless and thereby hinder a successfull attack. An improved measurement setup could
solve this problem. Nevertheless, we have successfully identified a way to uncover the AES leakage in the
EM trace. Follow-up work should be able to exploit this leakage.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Summary
In this project, we performed side-channel attacks on an Intel Atom Processor for RSA crypto scheme by
exploiting electromagnetic radiation leakage. The attacks were performed under three implementations:
simple multiply-and-square algorithm, exponentiation function in GMP library, and exponentiation function
in OpenSSL library.
For simple multiply-and-square algorithm, we use a 1024-bit key, which is a standard RSA key length.
The key for simple multiply-and-square algorithm was recovered successfully. However, there is a small error
percentage of about 4% due to signal interferences, and we expect to diminish or even eliminate this error
by performing the same attack several times.
In addition to simple multiply-and-square algorithm, we performed attack on RSA using modular expo-
nentiation function in GMP library. The modular exponentiation function deploys sliding window algorithm,
which performs pre-computations in accordance to the window size, or the number of exponent bits. We
discovered that the number of pre-computations varies with key length. We have tabulated the number
of pre-computations performed for diﬀerent key lengths. Although multiply and square operations can be
distinguished easily, diﬀerent number of pre-computations for diﬀerent key length suggests that recovering
the full key is challenging and requires an additional key reconstruction method that is outside of the scope
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of this project.
Like GMP library, OpenSSL modular exponentiation function makes use of the sliding window algorithm.
In addition to the sliding window algorithm, OpenSSL library uses Montgomery Reduction algorithm, which
makes it more eﬃcient than GMP library. As in our attack on GMP library, we can recover the squares and
multiplies which can be used for a key recovery attack. However, some entropy of the key remains, since our
attack can not distinguish precomputed values during the multiplications.
Side-channel analysis on AES algorithm proves to be much more complex, and requires more commitment
than the analysis on RSA. Unlike RSA that requires a few electromagnetic traces to perform attack, AES
algorithm demands consideration of thousands of traces. Although the chance of recovering the key rises
with larger the number of traces considered, due to limited time and resources, we only managed to perform
an attack on 20,000 traces. In addition to the large number of traces required, successful AES attack needs a
proper alignment of AES operations among traces. We implemented alignment by the same filter technique
used in RSA attack and peak detection. However, we have not yet achieved a successful side-channel attack
on AES.
Overall, our project is a success as we can recover a standard 1024-bit RSA key for simple multiply
and square algorithm with very little error percentage. Besides, we have promising results with modular
exponentiation functions of GMP and OpenSSL cryptographic libraries. Although a full key recovery is not
possible so far for these implementations, we can recover parts of the key and analyze pre-computations. For
the AES implementation under OpenSSL library, a full key recovery is not possible at the current stage due
to the limited time frame available. However, we can successfully capture AES traces on the oscilloscope
and correctly identity the regions of AES encryptions. Therefore, even high-end embedded platforms are
vulnerable to side-channel attacks like EM attacks, and open source implementation are not protected.
5.2 Future Work
The next steps of this project would be to distinguish the diﬀerent pre-computations for RSA analysis, and
to resolve the alignment issue in AES analysis. Currently, only parts of the key can be recovered for modular
exponentiation of GMP and OpenSSL libraries. To distinguish among the diﬀerent pre-computations in
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electromagnetic traces will require more in-depth research and commitment. The next step regarding side-
channel analysis on AES would be to connect the oscilloscope with the network, and set up the oscilloscope
so that it properly captures each AES encryption trace while recording the corresponding plaintext and
ciphertext pair. This would require proficient manipulation of the oscilloscope using low-level scripts.
5.3 Contribution
Since we could successfully recover a standard 1024-bit RSA key for simple multiply and square algorithm,
the major conclusion from our project is that even high-end embedded systems like Intel Atom Processor
are vulnerable to side channel attacks. This suggests that there is potential threat in the security of current
embedded systems. The results from our project suggest that more extensive improvements are in need
for securing future embedded devices against side-channel attacks. Possible areas of research to eliminate
electromagnetic radiation leakage might include interfering the leakage signals.
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Appendix A
C Code and MATLAB Code
A.1 C Code
A.1.1 RSA simple multiply-and-square
1 #include " s t d i o . h"
2 #include "gmp . h"
3 #include <sys / timeb . h>
4 #include <sys / i o . h>
5 #include <unis td . h>
6 #include <termios . h>
7 #include <f c n t l . h>
8 #include <time . h>
9 int main ( )
10 {
11 /∗ IO t e s t rou t ine ∗/
12 p r i n t f ( "Test￿IO\n" ) ;
13 int fd ;
14 // ge t permiss ion to acces s COM1 por t
15 fd = open ( "/dev/ ttyS0 " , O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY|O_NDELAY) ;
16 i f ( fd ==  1) {
17 p r i n t f ( " i o ￿ e r r o r \n" ) ;
18 }
19 else {
20 f c n t l ( fd ,F_SETFL, 0 ) ;
21 }
22 int r ;
23 char t p s t r [ 1 0 ] ;
24 t p s t r [0 ]=0 x00 ;
25 // t e s t wr i t e to COM1 por t
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26 r = wr i t e ( fd , tps t r , 1 ) ;
27 i f ( r < 0) p r i n t f ( " f a i l ￿ to ￿wr i t e \n" ) ;
28 /∗ End o f IO t e s t rou t ine ∗/
29 /∗ prepare s l e e p time ∗/
30 t imespec s l e ep t ime ;
31 s l e ep t ime . tv_sec = ( time_t ) 0 ;
32 s l e ep t ime . tv_nsec = 1000000;
33 /∗ de c l a r e and i n i t i a l i z e v a r i a b l e s r e qu i r ed f o r RSA ∗/
34 mpz_t a , b , c , d ;
35 mpz_init ( a ) ;
36 mpz_init (b ) ;
37 mpz_init ( c ) ;
38 mpz_init (d ) ;
39 /∗ Prepare Pseudo Random Number Generator ∗/
40 gmp_randstate_t rnd ;
41 gmp_randinit_default ( rnd ) ;
42 unsigned int seed ;
43 seed = 10000;
44 gmp_randseed_ui ( rnd , seed ) ;
45 /∗ s e t a , b and c ∗/
46 mpz_urandomb(a , rnd , 2048 ) ;
47 mpz_urandomb( c , rnd , 2048 ) ;
48 mpz_nextprime ( c , c ) ;
49 mpz_set_str (b , " f f f f f f f f f f a a a a a a a a a a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 bbbbbbbbbb f f f f f f f f f f c c c c c c c c c c
50 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 0000000000 dddddddddd f f f f f f f f f f e e e e e e e e e e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 f f f f f f f f f f
51 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 888888888800000000007777777777 f f f f f f f f f f 6 6 6666666600000000005555555555
52 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 44444444443333333333222222222211111111110000000000 f f f f f f " , 1 6 ) ;
53 s i ze_t b i t s = mpz_sizeinbase (b , 2 ) ;
54 /∗ RSA exponen t i a t i on and modular reduc t ion ∗/
55 //d = a^b mod c
56 while (1 )
57 {
58 int i = 0 ;
59 mpz_set_ui (d , 1 ) ;
60 wr i t e ( fd , tps t r , 1 ) ; // send t r i g g e r to COM1
61 nanos leep(&s leept ime ,NULL) ; // de lay
62 mpz_mul(d , d , a ) ;
63 mpz_mod(d , d , c ) ;
64 for ( i = b i t s  1; i >= 0 ; i  ) {
65 mpz_mul(d , d , d ) ;
66 mpz_mod(d , d , c ) ;
67 i f ( mpz_tstbit (b , i ) == 1) {
68 mpz_mul(d , d , a ) ;
69 mpz_mod(d , d , c ) ;
70 }
71 }
72 nanos leep(&s leept ime ,NULL) ; // de lay
73 }
74 return 0 ;
75 }
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A.1.2 RSA modular exponentiation (GMP library)
1 #include <s td i o . h>
2 #include "gmp . h"
3 #include <as s e r t . h>
4 #include <sys / i o . h>
5 #include <unis td . h>
6 #include <termios . h>
7 #include <f c n t l . h>
8 #include " s t d l i b . h"
9 #include <sys / timeb . h>
10 #include <time . h>
11 int main ( )
12 {
13 /∗ IO t e s t rou t ine ∗/
14 p r i n t f ( "Test￿IO\n" ) ;
15 int fd ;
16 // ge t permiss ion to acces s COM1 por t
17 fd = open ( "/dev/ ttyS0 " , O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY|O_NDELAY) ;
18 i f ( fd ==  1)
19 p r i n t f ( "IO￿ e r r o r \n" ) ;
20 else
21 f c n t l ( fd ,F_SETFL, 0 ) ;
22 int r ;
23 char t p s t r [ 1 0 ] ;
24 t p s t r [ 0 ] = 0x00 ;
25 // t e s t wr i t e to COM1 por t
26 r = wr i t e ( fd , tps t r , 1 ) ;
27 i f ( r<0) p r i n t f ( " f a i l ￿ to ￿wr i t e \n" ) ;
28 /∗ End o f IO t e s t rou t ine ∗/
29 /∗ prepare s l e e p time ∗/
30 t imespec s l e ep t ime ;
31 s l e ep t ime . tv_sec = ( time_t ) 0 ;
32 s l e ep t ime . tv_nsec = 500000;
33 /∗ de c l a r e and i n i t i a l i z e v a r i a b l e s r e qu i r ed f o r RSA ∗/
34 mpz_t r e su l t , b , e , m;
35 mpz_init ( r e s u l t ) ;
36 mpz_init (b ) ;
37 mpz_init ( e ) ;
38 mpz_init (m) ;
39 /∗ Prepare Pseudo Random Number Generator ∗/
40 gmp_randstate_t rnd ;
41 gmp_randinit_default ( rnd ) ;
42 unsigned int seed ;
43 seed = 10000;
44 gmp_randseed_ui ( rnd , seed ) ;
45 /∗ s e t modulus , base and exponent ∗/
46 mpz_urandomb(m, rnd , 2048 ) ;
47 mpz_nextprime (m, m) ;
48 mpz_urandomb(b , rnd , 2048 ) ;
49 mpz_set_str ( e , " f f f f f f f f f f 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 f f f f f f f f f f 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 f f f f f f f f f f 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ f f f f f f f f f f 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 f f f f f f f f f f 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 f f f f f f f f f f 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 f f f f f f f f f f
51 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 0000000000 f f f f f f f f f f 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 f f f f f f f f f f 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 f f f f f f f f f f 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
68
52 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ f f f f f f f f f f 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 f f f f f f f f f f 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 f f f f f f f f f f 0 0 0 0 0 0 " , 1 6 ) ;
53 while (1){
54 wr i t e ( fd , tps t r , 1 ) ; // send t r i g g e r to COM1
55 nanos leep(&s leept ime ,NULL) ; // de lay
56 /∗ RSA modular exponen t i a t i on ∗/
57 /∗ r e s u l t = b^e mod m
58 mpz_powm ( r e s u l t , b , e , m) ;
59 nanos leep(&s l eep t ime ,NULL) ; // de lay
60 }
61 re turn 0 ;
62 }
A.1.3 RSA modular exponentiation (GMP library)
1 #include <s td i o . h>
2 #include <opens s l /bn . h>
3 #include <as s e r t . h>
4 #include <sys / i o . h>
5 #include <unis td . h>
6 #include <termios . h>
7 #include <f c n t l . h>
8 #include " s t d l i b . h"
9 #include <sys / timeb . h>
10 #include <time . h>
11 int main ( ) {
12 /∗ IO Test ∗/
13 p r i n t f ( "Test￿IO\n" ) ;
14 int fd ;
15 // ge t permiss ion to acces s COM1 por t
16 fd = open ( "/dev/ ttyS0 " , O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY|O_NDELAY) ;
17 i f ( fd ==  1)
18 p r i n t f ( "IO￿ e r r o r \n" ) ;
19 else
20 f c n t l ( fd ,F_SETFL, 0 ) ;
21 int r ;
22 char t p s t r [ 1 0 ] ;
23 t p s t r [ 0 ] = 0x00 ;
24 // t e s t wr i t e to COM1 por t
25 r = wr i t e ( fd , tps t r , 1 ) ;
26 i f ( r<0) p r i n t f ( " f a i l ￿ to ￿wr i t e \n" ) ;
27 /∗ End o f IO Test ∗/
28 /∗ prepare s l e e p time ∗/
29 t imespec s l e ep t ime ;
30 s l e ep t ime . tv_sec = ( time_t ) 0 ;
31 s l e ep t ime . tv_nsec = 500000;
32 /∗ RSA par t s t a r t s here ∗/
33 const char base_hex [ ] = "FFFF1111222233334444555566667777888899990000AAAABBBB
34 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿CCCCDDDDEEEE" ;
35 /∗
36 cons t char exp_hex [ ] = "FFFFF00000FFFFF00000" ;
37 ∗/
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38 /∗
39 cons t char exp_hex [ ] = "FFFFF00000FFFFF00000FFFFF00000FFFFF00000FFFFF00000
40 FFFFF00000FFFFF00000FFFFF00000" ;
41 ∗/
42 const char exp_hex [ ] = "FFFFF00000FFFFF00000FFFFF00000FFFFF00000FFFFF00000
43 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿FFFFF00000FFFFF00000FFFFF00000FFFFF00000FFFFF00000FFFFF00000FFFFF00000FFFFF
44 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 00000FFFFF00000FFFFF00000FFFFF00000FFFFF00000FFFFF00000FFFFF00000FFFFF00000
45 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿FFFFF00000FFFFF00000FFFFF00000FFFFF00000FFFFF00000FFFFF0" ;
46 const char mod_hex [ ] = "FFFF00005555AAAAFFFF00005555AAAAFFFF00005555AAAAFFFF
47 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 00005555AAAAFFFF00005555AAAAFFFF00005555AAAAFFFF00005555AAAAFFFF00005555AAAA
48 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿FFFF00005555AAAAFFFF00005555AAAAFFFF00005555AAAAFFFF00005555AAAAFFFF00005555
49 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿AAAAFFFF00005555AAAAFFFF00005555AAAAFFFF00005555AAAB" ;
50 BIGNUM ∗ r e su l t , ∗base , ∗exp , ∗mod ;
51 r e s u l t = BN_new( ) ;
52 base = BN_new( ) ;
53 exp = BN_new( ) ;
54 mod = BN_new( ) ;
55 BN_hex2bn(&base , base_hex ) ;
56 BN_hex2bn(&exp , exp_hex ) ;
57 BN_hex2bn(&mod, mod_hex ) ;
58 BN_CTX ∗ ctx ;
59 ctx = BN_CTX_new( ) ;
60 p r i n t f ( "Running￿modular￿ exponent ia t i on \n" ) ;
61 while (1){
62 wr i t e ( fd , tps t r , 1 ) ; // send t r i g g e r to COM1
63 nanos leep(&s leept ime ,NULL) ; // de lay
64 //RSA modular exponen t i a t i on
65 BN_mod_exp( r e su l t , base , exp , mod , ctx ) ;
66 nanos leep(&s leept ime ,NULL) ; // de lay
67 }
68 return 0 ;
69 }
A.1.4 AES 1-in-1
1 #include <opens s l / aes . h>
2 #include <sys / timeb . h>
3 #include <termios . h>
4 #include <time . h>
5 #include <s td i o . h>
6 #include <s t d l i b . h>
7 #include <unis td . h>
8 #include <sys / i o . h>
9 #include <sys / types . h>
10 #include <f c n t l . h>
11 #define BASEPORT 0x378 /∗ LPT1 ∗/
12 void pr in tdata (unsigned char∗ ptr , int number ) ;
13 // g l o b a l v a r i a b l e s
14 FILE ∗ f i l e ;
15 int main ( )
16 {
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17 int i , tem ;
18 unsigned int j ;
19 /∗ s e t permiss ions to acces s LPT1 ∗/
20 i f ( ioperm (BASEPORT, 3 , 1 ) ) { pe r ro r ( " ioperm" ) ; e x i t ( 1 ) ; }
21 /∗ prepare a t e x t f i l e to record p l a i n t e x t & c i p h e r t e x t pa i r s ∗/
22 f i l e = fopen ( " f i l e . txt " , "w" ) ;
23 f p r i n t f ( f i l e , " P la in t ex t ￿&￿Ciphertext ￿Pai r s ￿ f o r ￿AES￿Encryption \n" ) ;
24 /∗ AES par t s t a r t s here ∗/
25 unsigned char key [ ] = {0x00 , 0x00 , 0 x f f , 0 x f f , 0x55 , 0x55 , 0xaa , 0xaa , 0x00 ,
26 0x00 , 0 x f f , 0 x f f , 0x55 , 0x55 , 0xaa , 0xaa } ;
27 unsigned char in [ ] = {0x05 , 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x00 ,
28 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x01 } ;
29 unsigned char out [ 2 0 ] ;
30 unsigned char temp [ 2 0 ] ;
31 AES_KEY ke ;
32 AES_set_encrypt_key ( key ,128 ,& ke ) ;
33 p r i n t f ( " running ￿AES\n" ) ;
34 AES_encrypt ( in , out , &ke ) ;
35 for ( i =0; i< 5000 ; i++) {
36 pr in tdata ( out , i +1); // p r i n t p l a i n t e x t
37 outb (255 , BASEPORT) ; // s e t LPT1 por t to h igh ( s t a r t o f t r i g g e r )
38 /∗ do 2 AES encryp t i ons wi th the same p l a i n t e x t ∗/
39 AES_encrypt ( out , temp , &ke ) ;
40 AES_encrypt ( out , out , &ke ) ;
41 outb (0 , BASEPORT) ; // s e t LPT1 por t to low ( end o f t r i g g e r )
42 pr in tdata ( out , i +1); // p r i n t c i p h e r t e x t
43 for ( j =0; j <1048576; j ++); // de lay
44 }
45 f c l o s e ( f i l e ) ;
46 // take away permiss ions to acces s LPT1
47 i f ( ioperm (BASEPORT, 3 , 0 ) ) { pe r ro r ( " ioperm" ) ; e x i t ( 1 ) ; }
48 p r i n t f ( "end\n" ) ;
49 return 0 ;
50 }
51 void pr in tdata (unsigned char∗ ptr , int number ) {
52 int i ;
53 f p r i n t f ( f i l e , "%4d . ￿0x" , number ) ;
54 for ( i =0; i <16; i++) {
55 f p r i n t f ( f i l e , "%x" , (∗ ptr )>>4);
56 f p r i n t f ( f i l e , "%x" , (∗ ptr )&0x0f ) ;
57 ptr++;
58 }
59 f p r i n t f ( f i l e , "\n" ) ;
60 }
A.1.5 AES 100-in-1
1 #include <opens s l / aes . h>
2 #include <sys / timeb . h>
3 #include <termios . h>
4 #include <time . h>
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5 #include <s td i o . h>
6 #include <s t d l i b . h>
7 #include <unis td . h>
8 #include <sys / i o . h>
9 #include <sys / types . h>
10 #include <f c n t l . h>
11 #define BASEPORT 0x378 /∗ LPT1 ∗/
12 void pr in tdata (unsigned char∗ ptr , int number ) ;
13 // g l o b a l v a r i a b l e s
14 FILE ∗ f i l e ;
15 int main ( )
16 {
17 int i , k , l , number , temp ;
18 unsigned int j ;
19 number = 1 ;
20 /∗ s e t permiss ions to acces s LPT1 ∗/
21 i f ( ioperm (BASEPORT, 3 , 1 ) ) { pe r ro r ( " ioperm" ) ; e x i t ( 1 ) ; }
22 /∗ prepare a t e x t f i l e to record p l a i n t e x t & c i p h e r t e x t pa i r s ∗/
23 f i l e = fopen ( " f i l e . txt " , "w" ) ;
24 f p r i n t f ( f i l e , " P la in t ex t ￿&￿Ciphertext ￿Pai r s ￿ f o r ￿AES￿Encryption \n" ) ;
25 /∗ AES par t s t a r t s here ∗/
26 unsigned char key [ ] = {0x00 , 0x00 , 0 x f f , 0 x f f , 0x55 , 0x55 , 0xaa , 0xaa , 0x00 ,
27 0x00 , 0 x f f , 0 x f f , 0x55 , 0x55 , 0xaa , 0xaa } ;
28 unsigned char in [ ] = {0x01 , 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x00 ,
29 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x01 } ;
30 unsigned char out [ 2 0 ] ;
31 unsigned char temp [ 2 0 ] ;
32 AES_KEY ke ;
33 AES_set_encrypt_key ( key ,128 ,& ke ) ;
34 p r i n t f ( " running ￿AES\n" ) ;
35 AES_encrypt ( in , out , &ke ) ;
36 for ( i =0; i< 500 ; i++) {
37 for ( k=0; k<100; k++) {
38 pr in tdata ( out , number ) ; // p r i n t p l a i n t e x t
39 outb (255 , BASEPORT) ; // s e t LPT1 por t to h igh ( s t a r t t r i g g e r )
40 /∗ do 2 AES encryp t i ons wi th the same p l a i n t e x t ∗/
41 AES_encrypt ( out , temp , &ke ) ;
42 AES_encrypt ( out , out , &ke ) ;
43 outb (0 , BASEPORT) ; // s e t LPT1 por t to low ( end o f t r i g g e r )
44 pr in tdata ( out , number ) ; // p r i n t c i p h e r t e x t
45 number++;
46 for ( l =0; l <4000; l ++); // de lay
47 }
48 for ( j =0; j <1048576; j ++); // de lay
49 }
50 f c l o s e ( f i l e ) ;
51 // take away permiss ions to acces s LPT1
52 i f ( ioperm (BASEPORT, 3 , 0 ) ) { pe r ro r ( " ioperm" ) ; e x i t ( 1 ) ; }
53 p r i n t f ( "end\n" ) ;
54 return 0 ;
55 }
56 void pr in tdata (unsigned char∗ ptr , int number ) {
57 int i ;
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58 f p r i n t f ( f i l e , "%5d . ￿0x" , number ) ;
59 for ( i =0; i <16; i++) {
60 f p r i n t f ( f i l e , "%x" , (∗ ptr )>>4);
61 f p r i n t f ( f i l e , "%x" , (∗ ptr )&0x0f ) ;
62 ptr++;
63 }
64 f p r i n t f ( f i l e , "\n" ) ;
65 }
A.2 MATLAB Code
A.2.1 RSA 80-bit key
1 %% Raw Data
2 clear a l l
3 Fs = 2 .5 e9 ; % sampling f r e q
4 x = read_binary_trace f i l e ( ’ sim80_2 . 5G_2. t r c ’ , 8 ) ;
5 plot ( x ) ; xlabel ( ’ Amplitude ’ ) ; ylabel ( ’ Sample ’ ) ;
6 %% Spectrogram
7 %Compute spectrogram
8 WINDOW = 1500 ;
9 NOVERLAP = 0 ;
10 NFFT = 2^nextpow2(WINDOW) ;
11 [ S ,F ,T,P]= spectrogram (x ,WINDOW,NOVERLAP,NFFT, Fs ) ;
12 %Change the ax i s and p l o t
13 surf (T,F,10∗ log10 (abs (P) ) , ’ EdgeColor ’ , ’ none ’ ) ; grid on ;
14 axis xy ; axis t i g h t ; colormap ( jet ) ; view ( 0 , 9 0 ) ;
15 xlabel ( ’Time￿ ( s ec ) ’ ) ; ylabel ( ’ Frequency￿ (Hz) ’ ) ;
16 ylim ( [ 0 4e8 ] ) ;
17 %% Fi s r t F i l t e r ( Bandpass )
18 b1 = f i r 1 (2000 ,2/Fs ∗ [ 50 e6 80 e6 ] ) ;
19 x1 = f f t f i l t ( b1 , x ) ;
20 plot ( x1 ) ; xlabel ( ’ Amplitude ’ ) ; ylabel ( ’ Sample ’ ) ;
21 %% Rec t i f i e d Spectrum
22 p l o t spe c (abs ( x1 ) ,1/ Fs ) ;
23 %% Second F i l t e r ( Rec t i f y and Bandpass )
24 b2 = f i r 1 (50001 ,2/Fs ∗ [ 2 e4 6e4 ] ) ;
25 x2 = f f t f i l t ( b2 , abs ( x1 ) ) ;
26 plot ( x2 ) ; xlabel ( ’ Amplitude ’ ) ; ylabel ( ’ Sample ’ ) ;
27 %% Extrac t the RSA par t
28 y = x2 ( 1 . 8 e6 : 5 . 5 e6 ) ;
29 y = downsample (y , 1 0 0 0 ) ;
30 plot ( y ) ;
31 t = 1 : length ( y ) ;
32 %% Find Va l l e y s
33 [VALS,LOCS] = f indpeaks (y , ’MINPEAKHEIGHT’ , 1 5 ) ;
34 plot ( t , y ,LOCS,VALS, ’ o ’ ) ; xlabel ( ’ Amplitude ’ ) ; ylabel ( ’ Sample ’ ) ;
35 %% Decide MUL and SQ
36 [ IDX,C] = kmeans (VALS, 2 ) ;
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37 for i = 1 : length (LOCS) 1
38 i f IDX( i )==find (C==max(C) )
39 text (LOCS( i ) , 17 , ’M’ , ’ Color ’ , ’ r ’ ) ;
40 else
41 text (LOCS( i ) , 17 , ’S ’ , ’ Color ’ , ’ g ’ ) ;
42 end
43 end
A.2.2 RSA 1024-bit key
1 %% Raw Data
2 clear a l l
3 Fs = 250 e6 ; % sampling f r e q
4 x = read_binary_trace f i l e ( ’ sim1024_250M_2 . t r c ’ , 8 ) ;
5 plot ( x ) ; xlabel ( ’ Sample ’ ) ; ylabel ( ’ Amplitude ’ ) ;
6 %% Spectrogram
7 % Compute spectrogram
8 WINDOW = 1500 ;
9 NOVERLAP = 0 ;
10 NFFT = 2^nextpow2(WINDOW) ;
11 [ S ,F ,T,P]= spectrogram (x ,WINDOW,NOVERLAP,NFFT, Fs ) ;
12 %Change the ax i s and p l o t
13 surf (T,F,10∗ log10 (abs (P) ) , ’ EdgeColor ’ , ’ none ’ ) ; grid on ;
14 axis xy ; axis t i g h t ; colormap ( jet ) ; view ( 0 , 9 0 ) ;
15 xlabel ( ’Time￿ ( s ec ) ’ ) ; ylabel ( ’ Frequency￿ (Hz) ’ ) ;
16 %% Fi s r t F i l t e r ( Bandpass )
17 b1 = f i r 1 (2000 ,2/Fs ∗ [ 70 e6 80 e6 ] ) ;
18 x1 = f f t f i l t ( b1 , x ) ;
19 plot ( x1 ) ; xlabel ( ’ Sample ’ ) ; ylabel ( ’ Amplitude ’ ) ;
20 %% Second F i l t e r ( Rec t i f y and Bandpass )
21 b2 = f i r 1 (50000 ,2/Fs ∗ [ 2 e4 6e4 ] ) ;
22 x2 = f f t f i l t ( b2 , abs ( x1 ) ) ;
23 plot ( x2 ) ; xlabel ( ’ Sample ’ ) ; ylabel ( ’ Amplitude ’ ) ;
24 %% Extrac t the RSA par t
25 y = x2 ( . 695 e6 : 8 . 6 9 e6 ) ;
26 plot ( y ) ;
27 t = 1 : length ( y ) ;
28 xlabel ( ’ Sample ’ ) ; ylabel ( ’ Amplitude ’ ) ;
29 %% Find Va l l e y s
30 [VALS,LOCS] = f indpeaks ( y , ’MINPEAKHEIGHT’ , 0 . 5 ) ;
31 VALS =  VALS;
32 plot ( t , y ,LOCS,VALS, ’ o ’ ) ;
33 %% Plot Va l l e y s
34 [ IDX,C] = kmeans (VALS, 2 ) ;
35 plot (LOCS,VALS, ’ ∗ ’ ) ; hold on ;
36 plot (LOCS(IDX==1),VALS(IDX==1), ’ ∗ r ’ ) ;
37 xlabel ( ’ Sample ’ ) ; ylabel ( ’ Amplitude ’ ) ;
38 ylim ([ 2.5   . 5 ] ) ;
39 %% Decide MUL and SQ
40 [ IDX,C] = kmeans (VALS, 2 ) ;
41 % 0 i s SQ, 2 i s MUL
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42 ms = zeros (1 , length (VALS) ) ;
43 for i = 1 : length (VALS)
44 i f IDX( i )==find (C==max(C) )
45 ms( i ) = 0 ;
46 e l s e i f IDX( i )==find (C==min(C) )
47 ms( i ) = 3 ;
48 end
49 end
50 % Remove consecu t i v e MULs
51 for i = 1 : length (ms) 1
52 i f ms( i )==3 && ms( i+1)==3
53 ms( i +1) = 0 ;
54 end
55 end
56 % Convert to b inary key
57 ms = ms ;
58 ms( find (ms==3) 1) = 1 ;
59 ms(ms==3) = [ ] ;
60 %% Orig ina l key (1024 b i t )
61 % f a 0 b f c 0 d f e 0 9 f 8 0 7 f 6 0 5 4 3 2 1 0 (10 t imes each ) f ( x6 )
62 b = [0 0 0 0 ;0 0 0 1 ;0 0 1 0 ;0 0 1 1 ;0 1 0 0 ;0 1 0 1 ;0 1 1 0 ;0 1 1 1 ; . . .
63 1 0 0 0 ;1 0 0 1 ;1 0 1 0 ;1 0 1 1 ;1 1 0 0 ;1 1 0 1 ;1 1 1 0 ;1 1 1 1 ] ;
64 c = [15 10 0 11 15 12 0 13 15 14 0 9 15 8 0 7 15 6 0 5 4 3 2 1 0 ] ;
65 % Generate key
66 k0 = [ ] ;
67 for i =1: length ( c )
68 k0 = [ k0 repmat (b( c ( i )+1 , : ) , 1 , 1 0 ) ] ;
69 end
70 k0 = [ k0 repmat (b ( 1 6 , : ) , 1 , 6 ) ] ;
71 % p l o t ( k0 , ’∗  ’ ) ;
72 %% Adjustment
73 key = ms ;
74 key ( 1 : 2 ) = [ ] ;
75 key = [ key ( 1 : 1 00 ) 0 0 key (101 :end ) ] ;
76 key = [ key ( 1 : 2 70 ) 0 0 key (271 :end ) ] ;
77 key (400) = [ ] ;
78 key (650) = [ ] ;
79 key = [ key ( 1 : 7 75 ) 0 key (776 :end ) ] ;
80 key (868) = [ ] ;
81 key = [ key ( 1 : 9 45 ) 0 key (946 :end ) ] ;
82 %% Compare key
83 plot ( key , ’ ∗ r ’ ) ; hold on ;
84 plot ( k0 , ’ b ’ ) ; hold o f f ;
85 ylim ([  .1 1 . 1 ] ) ; xl im ( [ 0 1 0 2 4 ] ) ;
86 xlabel ( ’ Index ’ ) ; ylabel ( ’ Bit ￿Value ’ ) ;
87 % Percentage Error
88 error = sum(xor ( key , k0 ) )/ length ( k0 )
A.2.3 AES Write File
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1 %% Extrac t AES
2 clear a l l
3 Fs = 20 .0 e9 ;
4 b = 0 ;
5 remov = [ ] ;
6 t ic
7 for a = 10:20
8 %f i l e names%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
9 i f ( a<10)
10 f i l ename = [ ’ C1Test1114120000 ’ num2str( a ) ’ . t r c ’ ] ;
11 else i f ( a<100)
12 f i l ename = [ ’ C1Test111412000 ’ num2str( a ) ’ . t r c ’ ] ;
13 else
14 f i l ename = [ ’ C1Test11141200 ’ num2str( a ) ’ . t r c ’ ] ;
15 end
16 end
17 %read f i l e%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
18 x = read_binary_trace f i l e ( f i l ename , 8 ) ;
19 x = x(2 e4 : 8 e4 ) ;
20 %f i l t e r%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
21 b1 = f i r 1 (2000 ,2/Fs ∗ [ 50 e6 85 e6 ] ) ;
22 x1 = f f t f i l t ( b1 , x ) ;
23 %f ind peaks%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
24 [PKGS, LOCS] = f indpeaks ( x1 , ’MINPEAKHEIGHT’ , 40 , ’MINPEAKDISTANCE’ , . 02 e4 ) ;
25 t1 = 1 : length ( x1 ) ;
26 f igure ;
27 plot ( t1 , x1 , LOCS, PKGS , ’ o ’ ) ;
28 ylim ([ 60 8 0 ] ) ;
29 %cut t race us ing f i r s t and l a s t peaks%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
30 x2 = x1 (LOCS(end) 1.5 e4 :LOCS(end ) ) ;
31 % f i g u r e ;
32 % p l o t ( x2 ) ;
33 %downsample%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
34 x2 = downsample ( x2 , 1 6 ) ;
35 % f i g u r e ;
36 % p l o t ( x2 ) ;
37 i f ( length (LOCS) >= 14)
38 x2 = temp ;
39 remov = [ remov , a ] ;
40 end
41 %wr i t e f i l e f o r top peaks%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
42 f i l e ID = fopen ( [ ’ 1_’ , num2str( a ) ] , ’w ’ ) ;
43 for m = 1 : length ( x2 )
44 fpr intf ( f i l e ID , ’%9.5 s ￿%9.5 s \n ’ ,num2str(m) , num2str( x2 (m) ) ) ;
45 end
46 fc lose ( f i l e ID ) ;
47 %s to r e prev ious t race
48 temp = x2 ;
49 %loop count
50 d i sp l ay ( [ ’ count￿ i s ￿ ’ , num2str( a ) ] ) ;
51 % % peak check
52 % b = b + 1;
53 % d i s p l a y ( [ num2str ( b ) , ’ peak count i s ’ , num2str ( l e n g t h (LOCS) ) ] ) ;
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54 end
55 toc
56 %% %wr i t e f i l e f o r removed t r a c e s%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
57 f i l e ID = fopen ( ’ 1_removed ’ , ’w ’ ) ;
58 for m = 1 : length ( remov )
59 fpr intf ( f i l e ID , ’%9.5 s ￿%9.5 s \n ’ ,num2str(m) , num2str( remov (m) ) ) ;
60 end
61 fc lose ( f i l e ID ) ;
A.2.4 AES DEMA
1 %% Hypothes i s
2 % Get 8  b i t in each p l a i n t e x t
3 clear ; clc ;
4 num_trace = 1000 ; % num of t r a c e s used
5 num_time = 938 ; % num of time data po in t s
6 pt = zeros (1 , num_trace ) ;
7
8 f i d = fopen ( ’ f i l e 1 . txt ’ ) ;
9 fgets ( f i d ) ; % sk i p the 1 s t l i n e
10 for i =1:num_trace
11 temp = fgets ( f i d ) ; % read the p l a i n t t e x t
12 pt ( i ) = hex2dec ( temp ( 1 6 : 1 7 ) ) ; % ge t the 8  b i t (CHANGEABLE)
13 fgets ( f i d ) ; % sk i p the c ipher t e x t
14 end
15 fc lose ( f i d ) ;
16
17 % Sbox look up t a b l e
18 S c e l l = {
19 ’ 63 ’ , ’ 7 c ’ , ’ 77 ’ , ’ 7b ’ , ’ f 2 ’ , ’ 6b ’ , ’ 6 f ’ , ’ c5 ’ , . . .
20 ’ 30 ’ , ’ 01 ’ , ’ 67 ’ , ’ 2b ’ , ’ f e ’ , ’ d7 ’ , ’ ab ’ , ’ 76 ’ , . . .
21 ’ ca ’ , ’ 82 ’ , ’ c9 ’ , ’ 7d ’ , ’ f a ’ , ’ 59 ’ , ’ 47 ’ , ’ f 0 ’ , . . .
22 ’ ad ’ , ’ d4 ’ , ’ a2 ’ , ’ a f ’ , ’ 9 c ’ , ’ a4 ’ , ’ 72 ’ , ’ c0 ’ , . . .
23 ’ b7 ’ , ’ fd ’ , ’ 93 ’ , ’ 26 ’ , ’ 36 ’ , ’ 3 f ’ , ’ f 7 ’ , ’ cc ’ , . . .
24 ’ 34 ’ , ’ a5 ’ , ’ e5 ’ , ’ f 1 ’ , ’ 71 ’ , ’ d8 ’ , ’ 31 ’ , ’ 15 ’ , . . .
25 ’ 04 ’ , ’ c7 ’ , ’ 23 ’ , ’ c3 ’ , ’ 18 ’ , ’ 96 ’ , ’ 05 ’ , ’ 9a ’ , . . .
26 ’ 07 ’ , ’ 12 ’ , ’ 80 ’ , ’ e2 ’ , ’ eb ’ , ’ 27 ’ , ’ b2 ’ , ’ 75 ’ , . . .
27 ’ 09 ’ , ’ 83 ’ , ’ 2 c ’ , ’ 1a ’ , ’ 1b ’ , ’ 6 e ’ , ’ 5a ’ , ’ a0 ’ , . . .
28 ’ 52 ’ , ’ 3b ’ , ’ d6 ’ , ’ b3 ’ , ’ 29 ’ , ’ e3 ’ , ’ 2 f ’ , ’ 84 ’ , . . .
29 ’ 53 ’ , ’ d1 ’ , ’ 00 ’ , ’ ed ’ , ’ 20 ’ , ’ f c ’ , ’ b1 ’ , ’ 5b ’ , . . .
30 ’ 6a ’ , ’ cb ’ , ’ be ’ , ’ 39 ’ , ’ 4a ’ , ’ 4 c ’ , ’ 58 ’ , ’ c f ’ , . . .
31 ’ d0 ’ , ’ e f ’ , ’ aa ’ , ’ fb ’ , ’ 43 ’ , ’ 4d ’ , ’ 33 ’ , ’ 85 ’ , . . .
32 ’ 45 ’ , ’ f 9 ’ , ’ 02 ’ , ’ 7 f ’ , ’ 50 ’ , ’ 3 c ’ , ’ 9 f ’ , ’ a8 ’ , . . .
33 ’ 51 ’ , ’ a3 ’ , ’ 40 ’ , ’ 8 f ’ , ’ 92 ’ , ’ 9d ’ , ’ 38 ’ , ’ f 5 ’ , . . .
34 ’ bc ’ , ’ b6 ’ , ’ da ’ , ’ 21 ’ , ’ 10 ’ , ’ f f ’ , ’ f 3 ’ , ’ d2 ’ , . . .
35 ’ cd ’ , ’ 0 c ’ , ’ 13 ’ , ’ ec ’ , ’ 5 f ’ , ’ 97 ’ , ’ 44 ’ , ’ 17 ’ , . . .
36 ’ c4 ’ , ’ a7 ’ , ’ 7 e ’ , ’ 3d ’ , ’ 64 ’ , ’ 5d ’ , ’ 19 ’ , ’ 73 ’ , . . .
37 ’ 60 ’ , ’ 81 ’ , ’ 4 f ’ , ’ dc ’ , ’ 22 ’ , ’ 2a ’ , ’ 90 ’ , ’ 88 ’ , . . .
38 ’ 46 ’ , ’ ee ’ , ’ b8 ’ , ’ 14 ’ , ’ de ’ , ’ 5 e ’ , ’ 0b ’ , ’ db ’ , . . .
39 ’ e0 ’ , ’ 32 ’ , ’ 3a ’ , ’ 0a ’ , ’ 49 ’ , ’ 06 ’ , ’ 24 ’ , ’ 5 c ’ , . . .
40 ’ c2 ’ , ’ d3 ’ , ’ ac ’ , ’ 62 ’ , ’ 91 ’ , ’ 95 ’ , ’ e4 ’ , ’ 79 ’ , . . .
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41 ’ e7 ’ , ’ c8 ’ , ’ 37 ’ , ’ 6d ’ , ’ 8d ’ , ’ d5 ’ , ’ 4 e ’ , ’ a9 ’ , . . .
42 ’ 6c ’ , ’ 56 ’ , ’ f 4 ’ , ’ ea ’ , ’ 65 ’ , ’ 7a ’ , ’ ae ’ , ’ 08 ’ , . . .
43 ’ ba ’ , ’ 78 ’ , ’ 25 ’ , ’ 2 e ’ , ’ 1 c ’ , ’ a6 ’ , ’ b4 ’ , ’ c6 ’ , . . .
44 ’ e8 ’ , ’ dd ’ , ’ 74 ’ , ’ 1 f ’ , ’ 4b ’ , ’ bd ’ , ’ 8b ’ , ’ 8a ’ , . . .
45 ’ 70 ’ , ’ 3 e ’ , ’ b5 ’ , ’ 66 ’ , ’ 48 ’ , ’ 03 ’ , ’ f 6 ’ , ’ 0 e ’ , . . .
46 ’ 61 ’ , ’ 35 ’ , ’ 57 ’ , ’ b9 ’ , ’ 86 ’ , ’ c1 ’ , ’ 1d ’ , ’ 9 e ’ , . . .
47 ’ e1 ’ , ’ f 8 ’ , ’ 98 ’ , ’ 11 ’ , ’ 69 ’ , ’ d9 ’ , ’ 8 e ’ , ’ 94 ’ , . . .
48 ’ 9b ’ , ’ 1 e ’ , ’ 87 ’ , ’ e9 ’ , ’ ce ’ , ’ 55 ’ , ’ 28 ’ , ’ d f ’ , . . .
49 ’ 8c ’ , ’ a1 ’ , ’ 89 ’ , ’ 0d ’ , ’ b f ’ , ’ e6 ’ , ’ 42 ’ , ’ 68 ’ , . . .
50 ’ 41 ’ , ’ 99 ’ , ’ 2d ’ , ’ 0 f ’ , ’ b0 ’ , ’ 54 ’ , ’ bb ’ , ’ 16 ’
51 } ;
52
53 % Al l p o s s i b l e 8  b i t key
54 ke = 0 : 2 5 5 ;
55
56 % Compute the V matrix ( a l l p l a i n t e x t & a l l keys )
57 V = zeros ( num_trace , length ( ke ) ) ;
58
59 for i =1:num_trace
60 for j =1: length ( ke )
61 V( i , j ) = b i txo r ( pt ( i ) , ke ( j ) ) ; % XorKey ()
62 V( i , j ) = hex2dec ( S c e l l (V( i , j )+1)) ; % SubBytes ( )
63 end
64 end
65
66 % Compute the H matrix (hamming we igh t o f V)
67 H = zeros ( num_trace , length ( ke ) ) ;
68 for i =1:num_trace
69 for j =1: length ( ke )
70 H( i , j ) = sum( dec2bin (V( i , j ))== ’ 1 ’ ) ; % Hamming weigh t
71 % H( i , j ) = b i t g e t (V( i , j ) , 1 ) ;
72 end
73 end
74
75 %% Measurement
76 % Compute the T matrix ( power vs . time data t r a c e s )
77 T = zeros ( num_trace , num_time ) ;
78 for i =1:num_trace
79 f i d = fopen ( [ ’ 1_’ num2str( i  1 ) ] ) ;
80 temp = fscanf ( f i d , ’%g￿%g ’ , [ 2 i n f ] ) ; % read the t r a c e s
81 T( i , : ) = temp ( 2 , : ) ; % ge t the power data on ly
82 fc lose ( f i d ) ;
83 end
84
85 % Compute the R matrix ( c o r r e l a t i o n o f H and T)
86 R = zeros ( length ( ke ) , num_time ) ;
87 for i =1: length ( ke )
88 for j =1:num_time
89 R( i , j ) = cor r (H( : , i ) ,T( : , j ) ) ; % co r r e l a t i o n
90 i f ( isnan (R( i , j ) ) )
91 R( i , j ) = 0 ; % remove NaN
92 end
93 end
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94 end
95 %%
96 [ val , pos ] = max(R’ ) ;
97 [ val2 , pos2 ] = max( va l ) ;
98
99 dec2hex ( pos2 )
100
101 hold a l l ;
102 plot (R’ ) ;
103 xlabel ( ’ Sample ’ ) ;
104 ylabel ( ’ Co r r e l a t i on ’ ) ;
105 %%
106 f igure ;
107 plot (R’ , ’ k ’ ) ;
108 hold on ;
109 plot (R( pos2 , : ) , ’ r ’ ) ;
110 hold on ;
111 plot (R( 1 , : ) , ’ g ’ ) ;
79
